Kleiner Johannes
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539, Germany.
Conscious Cogn. 2020 Oct;85:102981. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2020.102981. Epub 2020 Sep 25.
Recently, it has been claimed that Integrated Information Theory and other theories of its type cannot explain consciousness ("unfolding argument"). We unravel this argument mathematically and prove that the premises of the argument imply a much stronger result according to which the observed problem holds for almost all theories of consciousness. We find, however, that one of the premises is unwarranted and show that if this premise is dropped, the argument ceases to work. Thus our results show that the claim of the unfolding argument cannot be considered valid. The premise in question is that measures of brain activity cannot be used in an empirical test of theories of consciousness.
最近，有人声称整合信息理论及其他同类理论无法解释意识（“展开论证”）。我们从数学角度剖析了这一论证，并证明该论证的前提意味着一个更强的结果，即几乎所有意识理论都存在所观察到的问题。然而，我们发现其中一个前提是没有根据的，并表明如果去掉这个前提，该论证就不成立了。因此，我们的结果表明，展开论证的说法不能被认为是有效的。上述有问题的前提是，大脑活动的测量方法不能用于意识理论的实证检验。
