Ingerslev Line Ryberg
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany.
Front Psychol. 2020 Sep 25;11:558709. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.558709. eCollection 2020.
The paper addresses the question of how to approach consciousness in unreflective actions. Unreflective actions differ from reflective, conscious actions in that the intentional description under which the agent knows what she is doing is not available or present to the agent at the moment of acting. Yet, unreflective actions belong to the field in which an agent experiences herself as capable of acting. Some unreflective actions, however, narrow this field and can be characterized by intentionality being inhibited. By studying inhibited intentionality in unreflective actions, the aim of the paper is to show how weaker forms of action urge us to expand our overall understanding of action. If we expand the field of actions such that it encompasses also some of the involuntary aspects of action, we are able to understand how unreflective actions can remain actions and do not fall under the scope of automatic behavior. With the notion of weak agency, the paper thus addresses one aspect of unreflective action, namely, "inhibited intentionality" in which an agent feels a diminished sense of authorship in relation to her possibility for self-understanding. The notion of weak agency clarifies how agency itself remains intact but can involve a process of appropriation of one's actions as one's own. With a diachronic account of consciousness in unreflective action, the paper accounts for possible self-understanding in cases where none seems available at the moment of action.
本文探讨了如何在非反思性行动中探讨意识问题。非反思性行动与反思性的、有意识的行动不同，在于行动者知道自己在做什么的意向性描述在行动时刻对行动者不可用或不存在。然而，非反思性行动属于行动者体验到自己有行动能力的领域。然而，一些非反思性行动缩小了这个领域，其特征可以是意向性受到抑制。通过研究非反思性行动中受抑制的意向性，本文旨在表明较弱形式的行动如何促使我们扩展对行动的整体理解。如果我们扩大行动领域，使其也包括行动的一些非自愿方面，我们就能理解非反思性行动如何仍然是行动，而不属于自动行为的范畴。借助弱能动性的概念，本文 thus 探讨了非反思性行动的一个方面，即“受抑制的意向性”，在这种情况下，行动者在自我理解的可能性方面感到自我归属意识减弱。弱能动性的概念阐明了能动性本身如何保持完整，但可以涉及将自己的行动占为己有的过程。通过对非反思性行动中意识的历时性描述，本文解释了在行动时刻似乎不存在自我理解的情况下可能的自我理解。
