Lumer Christoph
Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali, Politiche e Cognitive, Università degli Studi di Siena, Siena, Italy.
Front Psychol. 2019 Feb 21;9:2777. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02777. eCollection 2018.
According to many criteria, agency, intentionality, responsibility and freedom of decision, require conscious decisions. Freud already assumed that many of our decisions are influenced by dynamically unconscious motives or that we even perform unconscious actions based on completely unconscious considerations. Such actions might not be intentional, and perhaps not even actions in the narrow sense, we would not be responsible for them and freedom of decision would be missing. Recent psychological and neurophysiological research has added to this a number of phenomena (the "new unconscious") in which behavior is completely unconscious or in which the decision or its execution is influenced by unconscious factors: priming, automatic behavior, habitualized behavior, actions based on plain unconscious deliberations, intrusion of information from the dorsal pathway, etc. However, since this makes up the largest part of the behavior which is generally regarded as action, intentionality, yet agency, responsibility and even compatibilist freedom of decision for the largest part of our behavior may be threatened. Such considerations have led to a lively debate, which, however, suffers from generalizations that lump all these unconscious phenomena together. In contrast, the aim of this article is to discuss individual unconscious influences on our behavior separately with respect to what extent they require changes in traditional conceptualizations. The first part (sections 2-4) of the article outlines the "traditions" and their elaborations: the intentional causalist concept of action, an associated empirical theory of action and standard concepts of responsibility and compatibilist freedom of decision, as well as the challenges for them. In the second part (sections 5-9), the aforementioned unconscious influences on our actions (except for automated and habitualized actions, which I discuss elsewhere) are examined: 1. unconscious priming, 2. dynamically unconscious motives, 3. dorsal pathway information influencing conscious decisions, 4. unconsciously altered execution of conscious intentions, and 5. unconscious deliberations and decisions. To what extent do these phenomena C1. require a change in the concept of action, C2. curtail intentionality or agency, C3. responsibility, and C4. freedom? The result is: The curtailments prove to be far less dramatic than they initially appear; they require more watchfulness but no conceptual change.
依据诸多标准，能动性、意向性、责任以及决策自由都需要有意识的决策。弗洛伊德早已假定，我们的许多决策受到动态无意识动机的影响，或者说我们甚至基于完全无意识的考量做出无意识行为。此类行为可能并非有意为之，甚至或许严格来说都算不上行为，我们无需为之负责，决策自由也无从谈起。近期的心理学和神经生理学研究又增添了一些现象（“新无意识”），在这些现象中，行为完全无意识，或者决策及其执行受到无意识因素的影响：启动效应、自动行为、习惯化行为、基于纯粹无意识思考的行为、来自背侧通路的信息干扰等。然而，由于这构成了通常被视为行动的行为的最大部分，意向性乃至能动性、责任，甚至我们大部分行为的兼容主义决策自由都可能受到威胁。此类考量引发了一场热烈的辩论，然而，这场辩论存在将所有这些无意识现象一概而论的问题。相比之下，本文的目的是分别讨论个体无意识对我们行为的影响，探讨它们在多大程度上需要改变传统概念。文章的第一部分（第2 - 4节）概述了“传统”及其阐述：行动的意向因果主义概念、相关的行动实证理论以及责任和兼容主义决策自由的标准概念，以及它们面临的挑战。在第二部分（第5 - 9节）中，考察了上述对我们行动的无意识影响（自动化和习惯化行为除外，我将在其他地方讨论）：1. 无意识启动效应，2. 动态无意识动机，3. 影响有意识决策的背侧通路信息，4. 有意识意图的无意识改变执行，5. 无意识思考和决策。这些现象在多大程度上：C1. 需要改变行动概念，C2. 缩减意向性或能动性，C3. 责任，以及C4. 自由？结果是：缩减的程度远没有最初看起来那么显著；它们需要更多的警惕，但无需概念上的改变。
