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下一代汽车中的网络攻击、缓解技术、预期就绪情况和未来方向。

Cyber-attacks in the next-generation cars, mitigation techniques, anticipated readiness and future directions.

机构信息

School of Engineering, RMIT University, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia.

School of Engineering, RMIT University, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia.

出版信息

Accid Anal Prev. 2020 Dec;148:105837. doi: 10.1016/j.aap.2020.105837. Epub 2020 Oct 26.

Abstract

Modern-day Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) with more than 100 million code lines, running up-to a hundred Electronic Control Units (ECUs) will create and exchange digital information with other vehicles and intelligent transport networks. Consequently, ubiquitous internal and external communication (controls, commands, and data) within all CAV-related nodes is inevitably the gatekeeper for the smooth operation. Therefore, it is a primary vulnerable area for cyber-attacks that entails stringent and efficient measures in the form of "cybersecurity". There is a lack of systematic and comprehensive review of the literature on cyber-attacks on the CAVs, respective mitigation strategies, anticipated readiness, and research directions for the future. This study aims to analyse, synthesise, and interpret critical areas for the roll-out and progression of CAVs in combating cyber-attacks. Specifically, we described in a structured way a holistic view of potentially critical avenues, which lies at the heart of CAV cybersecurity research. We synthesise their scope with a particular focus on ensuring effective CAVs deployment and reducing the probability of cyber-attack failures. We present the CAVs communication framework in an integrated form, i.e., from In-Vehicle (IV) communication to Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2X) communication with a visual flowchart to provide a transparent picture of all the interfaces for potential cyber-attacks. The vulnerability of CAVs by proximity (or physical) access to cyber-attacks is outlined with future recommendations. There is a detailed description of why the orthodox cybersecurity approaches in Cyber-Physical System (CPS) are not adequate to counter cyber-attacks on the CAVs. Further, we synthesised a table with consolidated details of the cyber-attacks on the CAVs, the respective CAV communication system, its impact, and the corresponding mitigation strategies. It is believed that the literature discussed, and the findings reached in this paper are of great value to CAV researchers, technology developers, and decision-makers in shaping and developing a robust CAV-cybersecurity framework.

摘要

现代联网和自动驾驶汽车(CAV)拥有超过 1 亿行代码,运行多达一百个电子控制单元(ECU),将与其他车辆和智能交通网络创建和交换数字信息。因此,所有与 CAV 相关的节点内无处不在的内部和外部通信(控制、命令和数据)不可避免地成为顺畅运行的关键。因此,这是网络攻击的主要脆弱领域,需要以“网络安全”的形式采取严格有效的措施。目前缺乏对 CAV 网络攻击、各自缓解策略、预期准备情况以及未来研究方向的系统全面的文献综述。本研究旨在分析、综合和解释 CAV 推出和发展过程中对抗网络攻击的关键领域。具体来说,我们以结构化的方式描述了 CAV 网络安全研究核心的潜在关键途径的整体视图。我们特别关注确保有效的 CAV 部署和降低网络攻击失败概率,对其范围进行综合分析。我们以综合形式呈现了 CAV 通信框架,即从车内(IV)通信到车对车(V2X)通信,并附有可视化流程图,为所有潜在网络攻击接口提供透明的图片。同时概述了 CAV 因接近(或物理)访问而面临的漏洞,并提出了未来的建议。我们详细描述了为什么传统的网络物理系统(CPS)网络安全方法不足以应对 CAV 上的网络攻击。此外,我们综合了一张表格,其中包含了针对 CAV 的网络攻击、相应的 CAV 通信系统、其影响以及相应的缓解策略的详细信息。我们相信,本文讨论的文献和得出的结论对 CAV 研究人员、技术开发人员和决策者在塑造和开发强大的 CAV 网络安全框架方面具有重要价值。

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