Gurgula Olga
PhD; LLM; Lecturer in Intellectual Property Law at Brunel Law School, Brunel University London, Uxbridge, UK.
IIC Int Rev Ind Prop Copyr Law. 2020;51(9):1062-1085. doi: 10.1007/s40319-020-00985-0. Epub 2020 Oct 28.
As the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting the lives of thousands of people worldwide, the problem of timely access to affordable medicines has intensified today. Based on past experience of accessing medicines for life-threatening diseases there is a justifiable fear that access to any vaccines and treatments that are eventually developed may be hindered by patents, leading to unaffordable prices. In particular, one of the reasons that typically leads to high prices is strategic patenting employed by pharmaceutical companies. While this practice is currently considered lawful, this article argues that strategic patenting requires a long-overdue intervention by competition authorities and aims to attract their attention to its harmful effects. It maintains that, along with a more immediate negative effect in the form of high drug prices, strategic patenting affects dynamic competition by stifling innovation of both originators and generic companies. The article outlines the current approach to strategic patenting and provides arguments for the intervention of competition law. This, in turn, will open the possibility for competition authorities to investigate this practice and prevent its harmful effect on drug prices and pharmaceutical innovation, for the benefit of consumer welfare.
由于新冠疫情正在影响全球成千上万人的生活,如今及时获得价格可承受药品的问题更加突出。基于过去获取危及生命疾病药品的经验,人们有理由担心,最终研发出的任何疫苗和治疗方法可能会因专利而受阻,导致价格高得让人难以承受。特别是,导致药品价格高昂的一个典型原因是制药公司采用的策略性专利申请。虽然这种做法目前被认为是合法的,但本文认为,策略性专利申请早就需要竞争管理机构进行干预,并旨在引起它们对其有害影响的关注。文章认为,除了以高药价形式产生的更直接负面影响外,策略性专利申请还通过抑制原创企业和仿制药企业的创新来影响动态竞争。本文概述了当前处理策略性专利申请的方法,并为竞争法的干预提供了论据。反过来,这将为竞争管理机构调查这种做法并防止其对药品价格和制药创新产生有害影响创造可能性,从而造福消费者福利。