Hu Zhiqiang, Hu Yuan, Jiang Yushan, Peng Zhen
Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China.
School of Business, Hubei University, Wuhan 430062, China.
Entropy (Basel). 2020 May 13;22(5):546. doi: 10.3390/e22050546.
The timing of an initial public offering (IPO) is a complex dynamic game in the stock market. Based on a dynamic game model with the real option, this paper investigates the relationship between pricing constraint and the complexity of IPO timing in the stock market, and further discusses its mechanism. The model shows that the IPO pricing constraint reduced the exercise value of the real option of IPO timing, thus restricting the enterprise's independent timing and promoting an earlier listing. The IPO price limit has a stronger effect on high-trait enterprises, such as technology enterprises. Lowering the upper limit of the pricing constraint increases the probability that enterprises are bound by this restriction during IPO. A high discount cost and stock-market volatility are also reasons for early listing. This paper suggests a theoretical explanation for the mechanism of the pricing constraint on IPO timing in the complex market environment, which is an extension of IPO timing theory, itself an interpretation of the IPO behavior of Chinese enterprises. These findings provide new insights in understanding the complexity of IPOs in relation to the Chinese stock market.
首次公开募股（IPO）的时机选择是股票市场中的一个复杂动态博弈。基于带有实物期权的动态博弈模型，本文研究了定价约束与股票市场中IPO时机选择复杂性之间的关系，并进一步探讨其作用机制。该模型表明，IPO定价约束降低了IPO时机选择实物期权的行权价值，从而限制了企业自主选择时机，并促使其更早上市。IPO价格限制对高科技企业等高特质企业的影响更强。降低定价约束上限会增加企业在IPO期间受此限制约束的概率。高折价成本和股市波动性也是企业提前上市的原因。本文为复杂市场环境下IPO时机选择的定价约束机制提供了理论解释，这是对IPO时机选择理论的一种拓展，而IPO时机选择理论本身就是对中国企业IPO行为的一种阐释。这些研究结果为理解与中国股票市场相关的IPO复杂性提供了新的视角。
