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如何提升政府碳税在促进企业碳排放减少方面的作用:基于三阶段动态博弈视角

How to improve the function of government carbon tax in promoting enterprise carbon emission reduction: from the perspective of three-stage dynamic game.

作者信息

Qu Xinchi, Sun Xiangyan

机构信息

School of Management Science and Engineering, Shandong Technology and Business University, Yantai, 264005, China.

College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, 266590, China.

出版信息

Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2022 May;29(21):31348-31362. doi: 10.1007/s11356-021-18236-1. Epub 2022 Jan 10.

DOI:10.1007/s11356-021-18236-1
PMID:35006566
Abstract

Flexible strategy of carbon tax is an important chip for the government to promote the implementation of carbon emission reduction. However, low-carbon technological innovation of enterprises is bound to produce market competition problems with traditional production technology. Based on this, in order to explore the relationship between heterogeneous objectives, carbon tax pricing strategy of government and decision-making of heterogeneous enterprise in the market, and how the government can make better use of carbon tax to promote the implementation of carbon emission reduction, this paper constructs and analyzes a three-stage dynamic game model between the government and heterogeneous enterprises. It is found that higher carbon tax pricing is not necessarily conducive to promote the implementation of carbon emission reduction. When the government's primary goal is to promote low-carbon technology innovative enterprise to increase innovative investment, the government should adopt the unified pricing strategy of carbon tax and improve carbon tax pricing; when the primary goal of the government is to promote the promotion of low-carbon products, the government should adopt the differentiated pricing strategy of carbon tax and reduce the carbon tax pricing of low-carbon technology innovative enterprise. In addition, this paper also studies the impact mechanism of different government pricing strategies on heterogeneous enterprise decision-making under heterogeneous objectives of government.

摘要

灵活的碳税策略是政府推动碳排放减少实施的重要筹码。然而,企业的低碳技术创新必然会与传统生产技术产生市场竞争问题。基于此,为了探究异质性目标、政府碳税定价策略与市场中异质性企业决策之间的关系,以及政府如何更好地利用碳税来推动碳排放减少的实施,本文构建并分析了政府与异质性企业之间的三阶段动态博弈模型。研究发现,较高的碳税定价不一定有利于促进碳排放减少的实施。当政府的首要目标是促进低碳技术创新企业增加创新投入时,政府应采取碳税统一定价策略并提高碳税定价;当政府的首要目标是促进低碳产品的推广时,政府应采取碳税差异化定价策略并降低低碳技术创新企业的碳税定价。此外,本文还研究了在政府异质性目标下不同政府定价策略对异质性企业决策的影响机制。

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引用本文的文献

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Role of Enterprise Alliance in Carbon Emission Reduction Mechanism: An Evolutionary Game Analysis.企业联盟在碳排放减排机制中的作用:一个演化博弈分析。
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Precise Supervision of Enterprise Environmental Protection Behavior Based on Boolean Matrix Factorization under Low Carbon Background.基于低碳背景下布尔矩阵分解的企业环保行为精准监管。
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