Lloyd Peter B
School of Computing, University of Kent, Giles Ln, Canterbury CT2 7NZ, UK.
Entropy (Basel). 2020 Jun 22;22(6):698. doi: 10.3390/e22060698.
Models of consciousness are usually developed within physical monist or dualistic frameworks, in which the structure and dynamics of the mind are derived from the workings of the physical brain. Little attention has been given to modelling consciousness within a mental monist framework, deriving the structure and dynamics of the mental world from primitive mental constituents only-with no neural substrate. Mental monism is gaining attention as a candidate solution to Chalmers' Hard Problem on philosophical grounds, and it is therefore timely to examine possible formal models of consciousness within it. Here, I argue that the austere ontology of mental monism places certain constraints on possible models of consciousness, and propose a minimal set of hypotheses that a model of consciousness (within mental monism) should respect. From those hypotheses, it would be possible to construct many formal models that permit universal computation in the mental world, through cellular automata. We need further hypotheses to define transition rules for particular models, and I propose a transition rule with the unusual property of deep copying in the time dimension.
意识模型通常是在物理一元论或二元论框架内构建的，在这些框架中，心智的结构和动态源于物理大脑的运作。在心理一元论框架内构建意识模型的关注较少，即仅从原始心理成分推导心理世界的结构和动态，而没有神经基础。基于哲学理由，心理一元论作为解决查尔默斯“难题”的候选方案正受到关注，因此，审视其中可能的意识形式模型恰逢其时。在此，我认为心理一元论的简朴本体论对可能的意识模型施加了某些限制，并提出了意识模型（在心理一元论内）应遵循的一组最小假设。基于这些假设，通过细胞自动机有可能构建许多允许在心理世界中进行通用计算的形式模型。我们需要进一步的假设来定义特定模型的转换规则，我提出了一个在时间维度上具有深度复制这一不寻常特性的转换规则。
