Gao Shiping, Du Jinming, Liang Jinling
School of Mathematics, Southeast University, Nanjing, 210096, China.
Institute of Industrial and Systems Engineering, College of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110891, China.
Phys Rev E. 2020 Nov;102(5-1):052414. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.102.052414.
Behavior decision making, where individuals can efficiently express their preferences for all options, has a great impact on cooperation. Hereby, we institute a minimal model in well-mixed populations where whether and how to sanction defectors are decided by cooperators via different decision-making mechanisms. The results illustrate that whether cooperation can outbreak depends on the cooperators' preferences for sanction and complying with the electoral outcome. We highlight the role of individuals' preferences in the emergence of cooperation and show that there exists an intermediate degree of the cooperators' preference for sanction at which the cooperators' preference for complying with the electoral outcome has a negligible impact on cooperation. We point out whether conformity facilitates the emergence of cooperation depends on the cooperators' preference for sanction. We find, compared with individual decision making, whether collective decision making is more conducive to promoting cooperation crucially depends on cooperators' preferences as well as the consensus required for employing sanction.
行为决策，即个体能够有效地表达对所有选项的偏好，对合作有很大影响。在此，我们在充分混合的群体中建立了一个最小模型，其中合作者通过不同的决策机制来决定是否以及如何制裁背叛者。结果表明，合作能否爆发取决于合作者对制裁和遵守选举结果的偏好。我们强调了个体偏好在合作出现中的作用，并表明存在一个合作者对制裁的偏好中间程度，在这个程度上，合作者对遵守选举结果的偏好对合作的影响可以忽略不计。我们指出，从众是否促进合作的出现取决于合作者对制裁的偏好。我们发现，与个体决策相比，集体决策是否更有利于促进合作关键取决于合作者的偏好以及实施制裁所需的共识。
