Smith J David, Jackson Brooke N, Church Barbara A
Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, United States.
Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, GA 30034, United States.
Anim Behav Cogn. 2019 Nov;6(4):236-246. doi: 10.26451/abc.06.04.03.2019.
The authors consider theory in the animal-metacognition literature. Theoretical interpretation was long dominated by associative descriptions, as illustrated in the 2009 special issue. We suggest that this approach risks a self-limiting understanding of animal mind, and an imprecise understanding of the cognitive requirements inherent in metacognition tasks. In fact, some tasks self-entail the need for higher-level decision-making processes, processes that-in humans-we would call explicit, declarative, and conscious. These points are illustrated using the inaugural study on dolphin metacognition. We urge researchers to turn more toward illuminating the cognitive architecture of capacities like metacognition, including illuminating the depth, and structure, the learning/memory systems, the cognitive levels, and the declarative awareness possibly present in animals' minds. The empirical development of this literature demonstrates that researchers are now prepared to do so. This study can produce strong synergies across the allied fields of biopsychology, comparative and cognitive psychology, and neuroscience.
作者们探讨了动物元认知文献中的理论。如2009年特刊所示，理论解释长期以来一直由联想描述主导。我们认为，这种方法可能会对动物思维产生自我限制的理解，并且对元认知任务中固有的认知要求理解不准确。事实上，一些任务本身就需要更高层次的决策过程，在人类中，我们会将这些过程称为明确的、陈述性的和有意识的。通过海豚元认知的开创性研究来说明这些观点。我们敦促研究人员更多地转向阐明诸如元认知等能力的认知架构，包括阐明其深度、结构、学习/记忆系统、认知水平以及动物思维中可能存在的陈述性意识。该文献的实证发展表明，研究人员现在已准备好这样做。这项研究可以在生物心理学、比较与认知心理学以及神经科学等相关领域产生强大的协同效应。
