Centre for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany; Department of Psychology, Heidelberg University, Hauptstrasse 47-51, 69117 Heidelberg, Germany.
Department of Psychology, University of Tübingen, Schleichstr. 4, 72076 Tübingen, Germany; Interdisciplinary Center for Scientific Computing (IWR), Heidelberg University, Im Neuenheimer Feld 205, 69120 Heidelberg, Germany.
Cognition. 2021 Mar;208:104545. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104545. Epub 2020 Dec 18.
One of the oldest debates in psychological research into politicized science such as nanotechnology, vaccination, or climate change centers around the role of knowledge. Does increased knowledge of the science affect beliefs about it? While research has traditionally focused on the role of object-level knowledge, here we highlight the importance of meta-knowledge: How much people believe they know about the science. Specifically, we demonstrate the importance of meta-knowledge (measured as confidence in knowledge) for explaining beliefs about science with one of the most contested examples: climate change. For a national Germany sample (N = 509), frequentist and Bayesian analyses demonstrated that climate change meta-knowledge was predictive of climate change beliefs, above and beyond object-level climate change knowledge. These results held for both the belief that climate change is risky, and the belief that climate change is anthropogenic, and when controlling for political attitude, and demographic variables. Furthermore, for a second national German sample (N = 588), confidence in climate change knowledge was a stronger predictor of climate change beliefs compared to confidence in other-domain (biological and physical) science knowledge, suggesting that outside of the respective domain, metacognitive confidence did not explain beliefs. These results highlight the relevance of domain-specific metacognition for explaining beliefs about the contested science of climate change. By demonstrating the relevance of metacognitive, rather than solely object-level thought, these results add to our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms involved in the formation of beliefs about politicized science.
在对纳米技术、疫苗接种或气候变化等政治化科学的心理学研究中,最古老的争论之一围绕着知识的作用展开。科学知识的增加是否会影响人们对科学的看法?虽然传统研究侧重于客观知识的作用,但在这里我们强调元知识的重要性:人们对科学的了解程度。具体来说,我们通过一个最具争议的例子来证明元知识(以知识信心衡量)对解释科学信仰的重要性:气候变化。对于德国的一个全国性样本(N=509),经典和贝叶斯分析表明,气候变化元知识可以预测气候变化的信念,超出了对气候变化的客观知识。这些结果适用于气候变化具有风险的信念和气候变化是人为的信念,并且在控制政治态度和人口统计学变量时也是如此。此外,对于第二个德国全国性样本(N=588),与对其他领域(生物和物理)科学知识的信心相比,对气候变化知识的信心是气候变化信念的更强预测指标,这表明在各自领域之外,元认知信心并不能解释信念。这些结果强调了特定领域元认知对解释有争议的气候变化科学的信仰的重要性。通过证明元认知而不仅仅是客观思维的相关性,这些结果增加了我们对形成有关政治化科学的信仰所涉及的认知机制的理解。