Université Clermont Auvergne, AgroParisTech, INRAE, VetAgro Sup, Territoires, 9 Avenue Blaise Pascal, CS 20085, 63178, Aubière, France.
J Environ Manage. 2021 Feb 15;280:111845. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2020.111845. Epub 2020 Dec 23.
In the European Union (EU) context, regulatory instruments and incentive schemes targeting individual farms remain the main policy instruments implemented to control diffuse pollution from agriculture. Yet, collective approaches to policy implementation have been recently developing. This article aims at assessing the potential for hybrid policy instruments relying on collective action among farmers to limit diffuse nitrate pollution from agriculture. Transaction cost economics are used to assess the potential advantages of collective action as a complement to regulatory and incentive policy tools. The conditions under which such hybrid forms of governance may be successful are identified using the Social-Ecological System (SES) framework. A review of empirical studies documenting cases of collective action for policy implementation in the EU context serves as a basis for the identification of the factors likely to affect the potential of collective approaches for water quality management in agriculture. The analysis relies more particularly on two cases: the Environmental Cooperatives in the Netherlands and the "Ferti-Mieux" operations in France. The results suggest that collective action is a relevant tool to consider for improving the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of policies targeting diffuse pollution from agriculture. In particular, relying on farmers' cooperation for policy implementation may be associated with advantages in terms of transaction costs. However, such advantages will be effective under a number of conditions related to the characteristics of the water resource, the actors involved, the governance of cooperation and the broader economic and institutional contexts.
在欧盟（EU）的背景下，针对单个农场的监管工具和激励机制仍然是控制农业面源污染的主要政策工具。然而，集体政策实施方法最近也在发展。本文旨在评估基于农民集体行动的混合政策工具在限制农业面源硝酸盐污染方面的潜力。交易成本经济学用于评估集体行动作为监管和激励政策工具的补充的潜在优势。使用社会-生态系统（SES）框架确定此类混合治理形式成功的条件。对记录欧盟背景下集体行动实施政策案例的实证研究进行了回顾，以此作为确定可能影响农业水质管理中集体方法潜力的因素的基础。该分析特别依赖于两个案例：荷兰的环境合作社和法国的“Ferti-Mieux”行动。结果表明，集体行动是一个值得考虑的工具，可用于提高针对农业面源污染的政策的有效性和成本效益。特别是，依靠农民合作来实施政策可能在交易成本方面具有优势。然而，这些优势只有在与水资源特征、相关行动者、合作治理以及更广泛的经济和制度背景相关的一系列条件下才会生效。
