Reddy Rama Krishna, Fabian Frances
Judd Leighton School of Business and Economics, Indiana University South Bend, South Bend, IN USA.
Fogelman College of Business and Economics, The University of Memphis, Memphis, TN USA.
Manag Int Rev. 2020;60(6):909-938. doi: 10.1007/s11575-020-00431-w. Epub 2021 Jan 7.
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are often dubbed as a market for lemons because of the extent of information asymmetry embedded in M&A transactions. A country's institutional environment influences the quality and overall reliability of formal disclosures, thereby altering the extent of information asymmetry affiliated with an M&A transaction. We argue that the caliber of the host country's institutionsformal and the informal cultural institution of affects the of M&A transactions, i.e., the phase in which firms attempt to resolve issues related to information asymmetry. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 3376 foreign acquisitions completed by U.S. firms between 2006 and 2016. Our results indicate that formal institutions lower arbitration duration. But, while high uncertainty avoidance lowers duration as expected for countries with low market-supporting institutions, it more strongly raises the duration for countries with high market-supporting institutions.
由于并购交易中存在信息不对称问题，并购活动常被称为“柠檬市场”。一个国家的制度环境会影响正式披露信息的质量和整体可靠性，从而改变与并购交易相关的信息不对称程度。我们认为，东道国的正式制度和非正式文化制度的质量会影响并购交易的阶段，即企业试图解决信息不对称相关问题的阶段。我们使用2006年至2016年间美国公司完成的3376宗外国收购样本对我们的假设进行了检验。我们的结果表明，正式制度会缩短仲裁时间。但是，虽然高不确定性规避如预期的那样会缩短市场支持制度薄弱国家的仲裁时间，但它会更显著地延长市场支持制度完善国家的仲裁时间。
