Sun Sunny Li, Ko Young Jin
Robert J. Manning School of Business, University of Massachusetts Lowell, 72 University Ave, 01854 Lowell, MA USA.
Sungkyunkwan University, 25-2, Seonggyungwan-ro, Seoul, South Korea.
Manag Int Rev. 2023;63(2):247-284. doi: 10.1007/s11575-023-00501-9. Epub 2023 Feb 6.
Drawing from the literature on institutional pressure, we argue that firms with different ownership types have different strategic options in domestic and overseas markets, namely the zone of conformity. State-controlled enterprises (SCEs) have a broader range of acceptable actions than do private-controlled enterprises (PCEs) in a domestic market but face more sanctions and stricter conformity requests in an overseas market. The concept of the zone of conformity predicts SCEs have a higher probability of deal failure overseas than in domestic markets and strategically seek less equity ownership of target firms in cross-border deals. The autocracy level of target country moderates the M&A behaviors difference between SCEs and PCEs. Our analysis of 12,497 Chinese mergers and acquisitions supports the study hypotheses.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11575-023-00501-9.
借鉴有关制度压力的文献，我们认为不同所有制类型的企业在国内外市场有不同的战略选择，即合规区。在国内市场，国有企业比民营企业有更广泛的可接受行为范围，但在海外市场面临更多制裁和更严格的合规要求。合规区的概念预测，国有企业在海外交易失败的可能性高于国内市场，并且在跨境交易中战略性地寻求对目标公司较低的股权。目标国家的专制程度缓和了国有企业和民营企业之间的并购行为差异。我们对12497宗中国并购案的分析支持了研究假设。
在线版本包含可在10.1007/s11575-023-00501-9获取的补充材料。
