Oakland University William Beaumont School of Medicine, Rochester, MI, USA.
Med Health Care Philos. 2021 Jun;24(2):281-290. doi: 10.1007/s11019-021-10004-9. Epub 2021 Jan 21.
This article describes and rejects three standard views of reason in secular clinical ethics. The first, instrumental reason view, affirms that reason may be used to draw conceptual distinctions, map moral geography, and identify invalid forms of argumentation, but prohibits recommendations because reason cannot justify any content-full moral or metaphysical commitments. The second, public reason view, affirms instrumental reason, and claims ethicists may make recommendations grounded in the moral and metaphysical commitments of bioethical consensus. The third, comprehensive reason view, also affirms instrumental reason, but encourages ethicists to make recommendations grounded in the moral and metaphysical commitments of their private worldviews. A compatibilist view of public reason is then defended, which holds that each standard view captures an important role for reason in different aspects of secular clinical ethics. The article ends by identifying three implications for enduring theoretical debates in clinical ethics.
本文描述并驳斥了世俗临床伦理学中的三种标准理性观。第一种，工具理性观，肯定理性可以用于进行概念区分、绘制道德地理图以及识别无效的论证形式，但禁止提出建议，因为理性无法为任何具有完整道德或形而上学内涵的主张提供正当化依据。第二种，公共理性观，肯定工具理性，并声称伦理学家可以基于生物伦理共识的道德和形而上学承诺提出建议。第三种，综合理性观，也肯定工具理性，但鼓励伦理学家基于他们的私人世界观的道德和形而上学承诺提出建议。然后，为公共理性的相容论观点进行了辩护，该观点认为，每种标准观点都在世俗临床伦理学的不同方面为理性的作用提供了重要依据。本文最后确定了对于临床伦理学中持久理论争议的三个启示。
