Al-Moshaigeh Abdullah, Dickins Denise, Higgs Julia L
Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL USA.
East Carolina University, Greenville, NC USA.
J Bus Ethics. 2022;176(2):325-340. doi: 10.1007/s10551-020-04733-9. Epub 2021 Jan 19.
We investigate whether enforcement is influenced by politics by comparing the severity of PCAOB sanctions of individual CPAs to the severity of related state-level disciplinary actions imposed by boards of accountancy (BOAs). Our results provide evidence that when responding to PCAOB sanctions, BOAs under Republican regimes impose less severe penalties than do BOAs under Democratic regimes. Our data and analyses inform the regulatory and enforcement practices of the accounting profession and other professions. Most directly, motivated by improvements in technology that facilitate the cross-jurisdiction practice of public accounting, states have adopted mobility laws where CPAs are only required to be licensed in their state of residence to practice in multiple states. These laws simplify licensing but may complicate enforcement. Beyond generalized red-state, blue-state differences in enforcement, we find that non-resident CPAs receive less severe disciplinary actions. If not reasonably consistent across BOAs, regulators may be unwilling to delegate responsibility for enforcement to another state's BOA.
我们通过比较美国公众公司会计监督委员会（PCAOB）对个体注册会计师的制裁严厉程度与各州会计委员会（BOA）实施的相关州级纪律处分的严厉程度，来研究执法是否受到政治因素的影响。我们的研究结果表明，在回应PCAOB的制裁时，共和党政权下的BOA所施加的处罚比民主党政权下的BOA要轻。我们的数据和分析为会计行业及其他行业的监管与执法实践提供了参考。最直接的是，由于技术进步便利了公共会计的跨辖区执业，各州通过了流动法，规定注册会计师只需在其居住州获得许可，即可在多个州执业。这些法律简化了许可程序，但可能使执法变得复杂。除了执法方面普遍存在的红州与蓝州差异外，我们发现非居民注册会计师受到的纪律处分较轻。如果各BOA之间缺乏合理的一致性，监管机构可能不愿将执法责任委托给另一个州的BOA。
