Institute for Social Law, KU Leuven Leuven Belgium.
Eur J Health Law. 2020 Apr 16;27(2):147-167. doi: 10.1163/15718093-BJA10003.
This contribution examines deprivation of liberty in Belgian healthcare within the frameworks of the ECHR and CRPD. We develop and apply an ECHR-based framework to demonstrate that it is not the admissions to care facilities based on Belgium's involuntary commitment law that give rise to the unjustified deprivation of liberty, but those based on representation regimes. This can be remedied by broadening Belgium's involuntary commitment law. However, doing so would go against a CRPD-based framework, which is incompatible with the ECHR; the former opposes disability-based laws. Building on the right to legal capacity and to liberty, the scope of the CRPD's approach is uncovered. It is suggested that to reconcile the two frameworks, Belgium's involuntary commitment law should be abolished, and representation regimes should be changed to avoid (rather than to justify) deprivation of liberty. Although its desirability is open for discussion, this could solve a problem that occurs worldwide.
本贡献研究了在 ECHR 和 CRPD 框架内,比利时医疗保健中的自由剥夺问题。我们开发并应用了一个基于 ECHR 的框架,以证明导致不合理的自由剥夺的不是基于比利时非自愿承诺法的入住护理设施,而是基于代表制度的入住。通过扩大比利时的非自愿承诺法,可以纠正这种情况。然而,这样做将违反基于 CRPD 的框架,该框架与 ECHR 不一致;前者反对基于残疾的法律。在此基础上,揭示了 CRPD 方法的范围。建议为了协调这两个框架,应废除比利时的非自愿承诺法,并改变代表制度,以避免(而不是证明)剥夺自由。尽管其可取性有待讨论,但这可以解决全球范围内存在的一个问题。