Cook G A
J Hist Behav Sci. 1977 Oct;13(4):307-16.
This paper seeks to clarify those conceptual foundations of G.H. Mead's social behaviorism which are assumed, but not made explicit, in that writer's well-known volume Mind, Self and Society. These foundations are shown to be an outgrowth of Mead's early commitment to the organic conception of conduct underlying the psychological functionalism of the Chicago School. Further light is shed upon Mead's position by pointing out the fundamental differences between his model of conduct and that characteristic of the behaviorist tradition in American psychology.
本文旨在阐明G.H. 米德社会行为主义的那些概念基础,这些基础在这位作者著名的《心灵、自我与社会》一书中虽被假定,但并未明确阐述。这些基础被证明是米德早期对行为有机概念的承诺的产物,该概念是芝加哥学派心理功能主义的基础。通过指出他的行为模型与美国心理学行为主义传统特征之间的根本差异,能进一步阐明米德的立场。