China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, 221116, China.
China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, 221116, China.
J Environ Manage. 2021 May 15;286:112274. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2021.112274. Epub 2021 Mar 8.
In order to control air pollution better, China has adopted the central environmental inspection mechanism. This paper adopts the data of 290 prefecture-level cities in China to evaluate the air improvement effect of the central environmental inspection mechanism. Firstly, based on the Mechanism Design Theory and Principal-agent Theory, this paper analyzes the government incentive measures and effort levels under the conditions of information as symmetry and asymmetry. Then, this paper introduces Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) Model to evaluate the air improvement effect of the central environmental inspection mechanism. Lastly, this paper explores the sustainability of the environmental inspection mechanism through the regression analysis of environmental inspection revisit. The results show that: under the condition of information symmetry, the central government can make the local governments reach the Pareto optimal effort level through the design of incentive contract. In a short period of time, the first round of environmental inspection and environmental inspection revisit have significantly improved air quality, and significantly reduced PM2.5 and PM10 and other major single pollutants. In general, this system has had an immediate effect. The environmental inspection revisit has also significantly reduced the concentrations of AQI, PM2.5 and PM10. Compared with the first round of environmental inspection and environmental inspection revisit, the latter has a higher level of air pollution reduction and better effect. The sustainability of the improvement effect of environmental inspection mechanism is questioned. It is of great significance to evaluate the actual effect of the central environmental inspection system and tap the unique experience of "Chinese style" to explore how to control air pollution and promote green development.
为了更好地控制空气污染，中国采用了中央环境督察机制。本文采用中国 290 个地级市的数据，评估了中央环境督察机制对空气质量改善的效果。首先，基于机制设计理论和委托代理理论，本文分析了信息对称和不对称两种情况下政府的激励措施和努力水平。然后，本文引入了回归不连续设计（RDD）模型来评估中央环境督察机制的空气质量改善效果。最后，本文通过环境督察回访的回归分析，探讨了环境督察机制的可持续性。研究结果表明：在信息对称的情况下，中央政府可以通过激励合同的设计使地方政府达到帕累托最优的努力水平。在短时间内，第一轮环境督察和环境督察回访显著改善了空气质量，显著降低了 PM2.5 和 PM10 等主要单项污染物的浓度。总的来说，该制度具有立竿见影的效果。环境督察回访也显著降低了 AQI、PM2.5 和 PM10 的浓度。与第一轮环境督察和环境督察回访相比，后者的空气污染减排水平更高，效果更好。环境督察机制改善效果的可持续性受到质疑。评估中央环境督察制度的实际效果，挖掘“中国式”的独特经验，探讨如何控制空气污染、促进绿色发展，具有重要意义。
