UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA.
Inquiry. 2021 Jan-Dec;58:46958021991276. doi: 10.1177/0046958021991276.
This study assessed the relationship between hospital ownership of physician organizations (known as hospital-physician vertical integration) and facility fees billed to commercial insurers and physician service prices. Healthcare claims came from the IBM® MarketScan® Commercial Database (2012-2016, N = 30,716,800 office visit claims [CPT codes 99211-99215]), and hospital-physician vertical integration measures were from SK&A Office Based Physicians Database provided by IQVIA. Multi-variate, fixed-effect models were used to regress prices on market-level hospital-physician vertical integration; models included geographic market and year fixed effects, claim-level variables, and time-varying market-level variables. Analyses did not find that market-level hospital-physician vertical integration was associated with the billing of facility fees for office visits. However, vertical integration was associated with office visit physician prices for some specialties. A 10-percentage-point increase in vertical integration was associated with a 1.0% price increase for primary care, a 0.6% increase for orthopedics, and a 0.5% increase for cardiology; no such association was found for obstetrics/gynecology or oncology. When comparing metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the bottom quartile of changes in vertical integration from 2012 to 2016 to MSAs in the top quartile, we found the following relative price increases based on predicted values for claims in the top quartile: $1.64 (1.9% of mean 2012 predicted price) for primary care to $2.30 (3.1%) for orthopedics to $3.13 (3.4%) for cardiology. Differences in predicted price accounted for an estimated $45.8 million in additional expenditure on primary care office visits in the top quartile of MSAs in 2016. In summary, market-level hospital-physician vertical integration was positively associated with physician prices for select specialties, but was not associated with changes in the use of facility-fee billing. More evidence on the quality effects of hospital-physician vertical integration is needed, as price increases that are not accompanied by measurable quality improvements should be part of any regulatory review.
这项研究评估了医院拥有医生组织(称为医院-医生垂直整合)与向商业保险公司收取的设施费用和医生服务价格之间的关系。医疗保健索赔来自 IBM® MarketScan®商业数据库(2012-2016 年,N=30716800 次门诊就诊索赔[CPT 代码 99211-99215]),而医院-医生垂直整合措施来自 IQVIA 提供的 SK&A 门诊医生数据库。使用多变量固定效应模型来回归价格与市场水平医院-医生垂直整合的关系;模型包括地理市场和年度固定效应、索赔水平变量和随时间变化的市场水平变量。分析结果并未发现市场水平医院-医生垂直整合与门诊设施费用的计费相关。然而,垂直整合与某些专业的门诊医生价格相关。垂直整合增加 10 个百分点,与初级保健价格上涨 1.0%、骨科价格上涨 0.6%和心脏病学价格上涨 0.5%相关;妇产科或肿瘤学则没有这种关联。当将 2012 年至 2016 年垂直整合变化处于底部四分之一的大都市统计区(MSA)与垂直整合处于顶部四分之一的 MSA 进行比较时,我们根据顶部四分之一索赔的预测值发现了以下相对价格上涨:初级保健上涨 1.64 美元(2012 年预测价格的 1.9%),骨科上涨 2.30 美元(3.1%),心脏病学上涨 3.13 美元(3.4%)。在 2016 年顶部四分之一的 MSA 中,预测价格的差异估计导致初级保健门诊就诊额外支出增加 4580 万美元。总之,市场水平医院-医生垂直整合与某些专业的医生价格呈正相关,但与设施费用计费的使用变化无关。需要更多关于医院-医生垂直整合质量影响的证据,因为没有可衡量的质量改进的价格上涨应该是任何监管审查的一部分。