Can computer forensic tools be trusted in digital investigations?

This paper investigates whether computer forensic tools (CFTs) can extract complete and credible digital evidence from digital crime scenes in the presence of file system anti-forensic (AF) attacks. The study uses a well-established six stage forensic tool testing methodology based on black-box testing principles to carry out experiments that evaluate four leading CFTs for their potential to combat eleven different file system AF attacks. Results suggest that only a few AF attacks are identified by all the evaluated CFTs, while as most of the attacks considered by the study go unnoticed. These AF attacks exploit basic file system features, can be executed using simple tools, and even attack CFTs to accomplish their task. These results imply that evidences collected by CFTs in digital investigations are not complete and credible in the presence of AF attacks. The study suggests that practitioners and academicians should not absolutely rely on CFTs for evidence extraction from a digital crime scene, highlights the implications of doing so, and makes many recommendations in this regard. The study also points towards immediate and aggressive research efforts that are required in the area of computer forensics to address the pitfalls of CFTs.