School of Public Administration and Policy, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China.
School of Economics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2021 Mar 31;18(7):3645. doi: 10.3390/ijerph18073645.
Food safety is related to public health, social welfare, and human survival, all of which are important and pressing areas of concern all over the world. The government plays an increasingly important role in the supervision of food safety. The role of the government, however, is also controversial. Using provincial panel data of China from 2005 to 2015, the present study intends to shed light on the associations between government intervention and food safety performance under two scenarios of local government-competition and noncompetition. This will be accomplished through an exploratory spatial data analysis and a spatial econometric model. The results reveal negative associations between food safety performance and government intervention without considering local government competition. As was also observed, government intervention not only inhibits the improvement of food safety in the region, but also has a negative spatial spillover effect on food safety in neighboring provinces. This is the result after considering government competition, thus, showing the competitive strategic interaction of the "race to the bottom". Further analysis reveals that, if geographically similar regions are selected as reference objects, the food safety performance of each province will have a stronger tendency to compete for the better. If regions with similar economic development levels are selected as reference objects, food safety performance will have a stronger tendency to compete for the worse. This work provides new evidence for the relationships between government intervention and food safety, and, also, proposes some insightful implications for policymakers for governing food safety.
食品安全与公众健康、社会福利和人类生存息息相关,是全世界都高度重视且亟待解决的重要问题。政府在食品安全监管方面发挥着越来越重要的作用。然而,政府的作用也存在争议。本文利用中国 2005-2015 年省级面板数据,通过探索性空间数据分析和空间计量模型,在地方政府竞争和非竞争两种情景下,研究政府干预与食品安全绩效之间的关系。结果表明,不考虑地方政府竞争时,食品安全绩效与政府干预呈负相关。研究还发现,政府干预不仅抑制了本地区食品安全水平的提高,而且对相邻省份的食品安全也存在负的空间溢出效应。这是在考虑政府竞争后的结果,表明了“逐底竞争”的竞争战略互动。进一步的分析表明,如果选择地理位置相似的地区作为参照对象,每个省份的食品安全绩效将更倾向于向好竞争;如果选择经济发展水平相似的地区作为参照对象,食品安全绩效将更倾向于向差竞争。本研究为政府干预与食品安全之间的关系提供了新的证据,也为政策制定者治理食品安全提供了一些有益的启示。