管理层股权激励与股价崩盘风险：“金手铐”还是“金表”。
Management equity incentives and stock price crash risk: "Golden handcuffs" or "gold watch".
作者信息
Zhou Xiaohua, Wan Jinshi, Yang Yi, Gan Xiangyu
机构信息
School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China.
Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom.
出版信息
PLoS One. 2021 Apr 26;16(4):e0249900. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0249900. eCollection 2021.
This paper expands the previous research on management equity incentives (MEIs) and stock price crash risk by distinguishing between the "gold watch" region and the "golden handcuff" regions in MEIs. By using an estimation of the gold watch region and the golden handcuff regions based on 6,675 annual observations of China's A-share listed companies, the stock price crash risk is found to be negatively correlated with MEIs in the golden handcuff regions (0-10%, 30%-100%) and is positively correlated with MEIs in the gold watch region (10%-30%). A further investigation of the mediating effects of peer effects on MEIs and the stock price crash risk reveals that peer effects have a partial mediation effect at the level of peer managers' shareholding and mediate the relationship between MEIs and the stock price crash risk.
本文通过区分管理层股权激励中的“金手铐”区域和“金表”区域，拓展了先前关于管理层股权激励（MEIs）与股价崩盘风险的研究。基于对中国A股上市公司6675个年度观测值进行的“金表”区域和“金手铐”区域估计，研究发现股价崩盘风险在“金手铐”区域（0 - 10%，30% - 100%）与管理层股权激励呈负相关，而在“金表”区域（10% - 30%）与管理层股权激励呈正相关。对同侪效应在管理层股权激励和股价崩盘风险之间的中介效应的进一步研究表明，同侪效应在同侪管理者持股水平上具有部分中介效应，并介导了管理层股权激励与股价崩盘风险之间的关系。
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