Wang Liang, Cao Ziqiu, Cao Wenyan
School of Economics and Management, Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710054, China.
Heliyon. 2024 Sep 5;10(18):e37473. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e37473. eCollection 2024 Sep 30.
It clarifies the influence mechanism of controlling shareholders' equity pledges, margin trading and securities lending, and stock price crash risk from the perspective of corporate governance, etc. This paper establishes a main and interaction effect regression model to empirically test the impact mechanism of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on stock price crash risk and the moderating effect of margin trading and securities lending in the process of this impact based on the measures of stock price crash risk, controlling shareholders' equity pledge level, as well as margin trading and securities lending transaction size, using China's A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020 as the sample. It finds that: (i) The higher the controlling shareholder's equity pledge ratio of listed companies, the lower the stock price crash risk. (ii) There is no significant effect of margin trading and securities lending transactions on stock price crash risk. (iii) Securities lending transactions have a positive moderating effect in the impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledges on stock price crash risk, but the moderating effect of margin trading transactions is insignificant.
它从公司治理等角度阐明了控股股东股权质押、融资融券与股价崩盘风险的影响机制。本文基于股价崩盘风险、控股股东股权质押水平以及融资融券交易规模的测度指标，构建主效应和交互效应回归模型，以2010—2020年中国A股上市公司为样本，实证检验控股股东股权质押对股价崩盘风险的影响机制以及融资融券在这一影响过程中的调节效应。研究发现：（i）上市公司控股股东股权质押比例越高，股价崩盘风险越低。（ii）融资融券交易对股价崩盘风险无显著影响。（iii）融券交易在控股股东股权质押对股价崩盘风险的影响中具有正向调节效应，但融资交易的调节效应不显著。
