William H. Miller III Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University.
Psychol Rev. 2021 Apr;128(3):592-595. doi: 10.1037/rev0000277.
According to the textbooks, blindsight is a neuropsychological condition characterized by preserved capacities for voluntary visual discrimination unaccompanied by visual awareness. So construed, blindsight precipitated a revolution in theorizing consciousness. In Phillips (Psychological Review, 2021), I argued that the textbooks are wrong and the revolution ill-founded. Blindsight is exclusively a matter of conscious, albeit qualitatively degraded, vision which appears unconscious because of conservative response bias. Michel and Lau (Psychological Review, 2021) object: first, that residual awareness in blindsight cannot account for patients' impressive, feature-specific discriminatory abilities; and second, that performance matching makes response-bias explanations of unreported awareness implausible. They then offer a positive picture of blindsight as a specific deficit of detection, locating this idea within a framework which distinguishes perceptual from response bias. Here, I explain why neither objection convinces. I then argue that Michel and Lau give us no good reason to prefer their approach to our simpler, conscious-vision-only alternative. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
根据教科书，盲视是一种神经心理学状态，其特征是存在伴随视觉意识的自愿视觉辨别能力。从这个角度来看，盲视引发了意识理论的革命。在菲利普斯（2021 年《心理学评论》）中，我认为教科书是错误的，这场革命也是毫无根据的。盲视完全是有意识的，尽管质量有所下降，但由于保守的反应偏差，它看起来是无意识的。米歇尔和劳（2021 年《心理学评论》）提出反对意见：第一，盲视中的残留意识不能解释患者令人印象深刻的、特定于特征的辨别能力；第二，表现匹配使得对未报告意识的反应偏差解释变得不可信。然后，他们提出了盲视的积极图景，即一种特定的检测缺陷，并将这个想法置于一个区分感知和反应偏差的框架内。在这里，我解释了为什么这两个反对意见都不能令人信服。然后我认为，米歇尔和劳没有给我们任何充分的理由来选择他们的方法而不是我们更简单的、只涉及意识视觉的替代方法。（PsycInfo 数据库记录（c）2021 APA，保留所有权利）。
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