University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, United States.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2021 Feb;85:166-175. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.10.005. Epub 2020 Nov 1.
Scientists often diverge widely when choosing between research programs. This can seem to be rooted in disagreements about which of several theories, competing to address shared questions or phenomena, is currently the most epistemically or explanatorily valuable-i.e. most successful. But many such cases are actually more directly rooted in differing judgments of pursuit-worthiness, concerning which theory will be best down the line, or which addresses the most significant data or questions. Using case studies from 16-century astronomy and 20-century geology and biology, I argue that divergent theory choice is thus often driven by considerations of scientific process, even where direct epistemic or explanatory evaluation of its final products appears more relevant. Broadly following Kuhn's analysis of theoretical virtues, I suggest that widely shared criteria for pursuit-worthiness function as imprecise, mutually-conflicting values. However, even Kuhn and others sensitive to pragmatic dimensions of theory 'acceptance', including the virtue of fruitfulness, still commonly understate the role of pursuit-worthiness-especially by exaggerating the impact of more present-oriented virtues, or failing to stress how 'competing' theories excel at addressing different questions or data. This framework clarifies the nature of the choice and competition involved in theory choice, and the role of alternative theoretical virtues.
科学家在选择研究计划时常常存在广泛分歧。这似乎源于对几种理论的分歧，这些理论竞相解决共同的问题或现象，目前哪种理论在认识论上或解释上最有价值，即最成功。但许多这样的情况实际上更直接地植根于对追求价值的不同判断，即哪种理论在未来会更好，或者哪种理论更能解决最重要的数据或问题。通过对 16 世纪天文学和 20 世纪地质学和生物学的案例研究，我认为，理论选择的分歧通常是由科学过程的考虑驱动的，即使最终产品的直接认识论或解释评估似乎更相关。我大致遵循库恩对理论优点的分析，认为广泛共享的追求价值标准作为不精确、相互冲突的价值观发挥作用。然而，即使是库恩和其他对理论“接受”的务实维度敏感的人，包括富有成效的优点，仍然普遍低估了追求价值的作用，尤其是夸大了更面向当前的优点的影响，或者未能强调“竞争”理论在解决不同问题或数据方面的优势。这个框架阐明了理论选择中所涉及的选择和竞争的性质，以及替代理论优点的作用。
