Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, USA.
Br J Psychol. 2021 Nov;112(4):934-963. doi: 10.1111/bjop.12495. Epub 2021 May 9.
There is ample evidence that attractive individuals, across diverse domains, are judged more favourably. But most research has focused on single/one-shot decisions, where decision-makers receive no feedback following their decisions, and outcomes of their judgements are inconsequential to the self. Would attractive individuals still be judged favourably in experience-based decision-making where people make iterative decisions and receive consequential feedback (money gained/lost) following each decision? To investigate this question, participants viewed headshots of four financial partners presented side-by-side and repeatedly (over 50-100 trials) selected partners that would help maximize their profits. Following every partner-selection, participants received feedback about the net monetary gains/losses the partner had conferred. Unbeknownst to participants, two partners (one attractive, one unattractive) were equally advantageous (conferred net-gains overtime) and two partners (one attractive and one unattractive) were equally disadvantageous (conferred net-losses overtime). Even though attractive and unattractive partners were equally profitable and despite receiving feedback, participants selected attractive partners more throughout the task were quicker to reselect them even when they conferred losses and judged them as more helpful. Indeed, attractive-disadvantageous partners were preferred to the same extent (or more) as unattractive-advantageous partners. Importantly, the effect of attractiveness on decision-making was fully explained by the perceived trustworthiness of the financial partners.
有充分的证据表明，在不同领域，有吸引力的个体通常会得到更有利的评价。但大多数研究都集中在单次决策上，决策者在做出决策后不会收到任何反馈，而且他们的判断结果对自身也没有影响。那么，在基于经验的决策中，当人们反复做出决策并在每次决策后收到相关反馈（收益/损失）时，有吸引力的个体是否仍然会得到有利的评价？为了研究这个问题，参与者会并排查看四个金融伙伴的头像，并反复（50-100 次）选择有助于最大化他们收益的伙伴。在每次选择伙伴后，参与者会收到关于该伙伴带来的净收益/损失的反馈。参与者并不知道，其中两个伙伴（一个有吸引力，一个没有吸引力）同样有利（随着时间的推移带来净收益），而另外两个伙伴（一个有吸引力和一个没有吸引力）同样不利（随着时间的推移带来净损失）。尽管有吸引力和没有吸引力的伙伴都同样有利可图，并且尽管收到了反馈，参与者在整个任务中还是更倾向于选择有吸引力的伙伴，即使他们带来了损失，参与者也会更快地重新选择他们，并认为他们更有帮助。事实上，有吸引力的不利伙伴和没有吸引力的有利伙伴同样受欢迎（甚至更受欢迎）。重要的是，吸引力对决策的影响完全可以用金融伙伴的可信任度来解释。
