Shozi Bonginkosi
School of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa.
J Law Biosci. 2021 Feb 24;8(1):lsab002. doi: 10.1093/jlb/lsab002. eCollection 2021 Jan-Jun.
It has been variously claimed that alterations to the human genome for reproductive purposes ought to be prohibited on the basis that doing so is contrary to human dignity. This claim leads to the conclusion that germline genome editing (GGE) ought to be categorically banned in all states committed to upholding human dignity as a right recognized in international human rights documents, and which has been entrenched in the constitutions of many liberal democracies. But is it the case that the right to human dignity is necessarily opposed to GGE? This paper explores this question through critical examination of the concept of human dignity in international human rights, and how it has been interpreted by individual states. Recognizing that the interpretation of human dignity is shaped by cultural context, the paper explores an African perspective on this issue, using South African constitutional jurisprudence on human dignity as an example. It concludes that when viewed through the lens of the African ethic of Ubuntu, there is no justification for a categorical prohibition on GGE, on the grounds that it is contrary to human dignity. This illustrates the need for a global discourse on the regulation on genome editing to be sensitive to varying perspectives-specifically on value-laden questions such as the interpretation of human rights.
人们提出了各种不同的主张，认为出于生殖目的对人类基因组进行改变应该被禁止，理由是这样做有违人类尊严。这一主张得出的结论是，在所有致力于维护人类尊严这一国际人权文件所承认的权利，且该权利已在许多自由民主国家的宪法中得以确立的国家，种系基因组编辑（GGE）都应被绝对禁止。但人类尊严权必然与种系基因组编辑相悖吗？本文通过批判性审视国际人权中的人类尊严概念以及各个国家对其的解释来探讨这个问题。认识到人类尊严的解释受文化背景影响，本文以南非关于人类尊严的宪法判例法为例，探讨非洲对此问题的观点。结论是，从非洲乌班图伦理的视角来看，没有理由以种系基因组编辑有违人类尊严为由对其进行绝对禁止。这表明全球关于基因组编辑监管的讨论需要对不同观点保持敏感——特别是对于诸如人权解释等充满价值判断的问题。
