Philosophy, Park University, Parkville, Missouri, USA
J Med Ethics. 2022 Jul;48(7):461-465. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2020-107207. Epub 2021 May 20.
Most opposition to induced abortion turns on the belief that human fetuses are persons from conception. On this view, the moral status of the fetus requires those in a position to provide aid-gestational mothers-to make tremendous sacrifices to benefit the fetus. Recently, critics have argued that this pro-life position requires more than opposition to induced abortion. Pro-life theorists are relatively silent on the issues of spontaneous abortion, surplus in vitro fertilisation human embryos, and the suffering and death of born persons due to lack of access to food, shelter and medical care. Colgrove call such arguments , arguing they 'do not matter' and mischaracterise them as attacks. Here, I argue these are better understood as moral dilemmas. While some critics argue pro-life inaction is evidence that they do not really believe human fetuses are persons, I contend this inaction is likely the result of resolvable confusion rather than moral negligence.
大多数反对人工流产的观点都基于这样一种信念，即人类胎儿从受孕时起就是人。根据这种观点，胎儿的道德地位要求那些有能力提供帮助的人——代孕母亲——为了胎儿的利益做出巨大的牺牲。最近，批评者认为，这种支持生命的立场不仅仅是反对人工流产。支持生命的理论家和学者对自然流产、体外受精胚胎过剩以及因缺乏食物、住所和医疗而导致出生的人遭受痛苦和死亡的问题相对保持沉默。Colgrove 将此类论点称为“无关紧要”，并将其错误地描述为攻击。在这里，我认为这些论点更好地被理解为道德困境。虽然一些批评者认为，支持生命的不作为是他们不相信人类胎儿是人这一事实的证据，但我认为这种不作为很可能是由于可以解决的困惑而不是道德上的疏忽造成的。
