Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine, United States.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2021 Aug;88:50-59. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.05.001. Epub 2021 May 26.
One of the primary tasks in building a quantum theory of gravity is discovering how to save spatiotemporal phenomena using a theory which, putatively, does not include spacetime. Some have taken this task a step further and argue for the actual emergence of spacetime from a non-spatiotemporal ontology in the low-energy regime. In this paper, it is argued that the account of spacetime emergence presented in Huggett and Wüthrich(2013) and then assumed in Baron (2019), Crowther (2016), Wüthrich (2017), and Wüthrich and Lam (2018) fails to accomplish the task to which it is set. There is a prima facie contradiction between the scale-independent ontology of spacetime in GR and the scale-dependent account of emergence proposed by this literature. One can avoid this contradiction but only at the cost of changing the target of emergence and by endorsing a perspectival theory of ontology - a view I call "ontic-perspectivism". Though this paper explicitly addresses spacetime emergence, many of the following arguments are applicable to other accounts where objects of ontology, or their properties, are claimed to emerge in the low-energy regime.
构建引力的量子理论的主要任务之一是发现如何使用一种理论来拯救时空现象,这种理论据称不包括时空。有些人更进一步,认为在低能态下,时空确实是从非时空本体论中出现的。本文认为,Huggett 和 Wüthrich(2013)提出的并随后被 Baron(2019)、Crowther(2016)、Wüthrich(2017)和 Wüthrich 和 Lam(2018)所假设的时空出现的解释未能完成它所设定的任务。GR 中与尺度无关的时空本体论和这一文献中提出的与尺度相关的涌现解释之间存在明显的矛盾。人们可以避免这种矛盾,但只能以改变涌现的目标为代价,并通过支持本体论的视角理论——我称之为“本体论的视角主义”。虽然本文明确涉及时空涌现,但以下许多论点适用于其他声称在低能态下本体论的对象或其属性涌现的解释。