Overgaard Morten
Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark.
Center for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark.
Front Behav Neurosci. 2021 May 21;15:653041. doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2021.653041. eCollection 2021.
The question of consciousness in other species, not least species very physically different from humans such as insects, is highly challenging for a number of reasons. One reason is that we do not have any available empirical method to answer the question. Another reason is that current theories of consciousness disagree about the relation between physical structure and consciousness, i.e., whether consciousness requires specific, say, neural structures or whether consciousness can be realized in different ways. This article sets out to analyze if and how there could be an empirical and/or a theoretical approach to the topic on the basis of current consciousness research in humans.
其他物种的意识问题,尤其是那些在生理上与人类有很大差异的物种,比如昆虫,由于多种原因极具挑战性。一个原因是我们没有任何可用的实证方法来回答这个问题。另一个原因是当前的意识理论在物理结构与意识的关系上存在分歧,也就是说,意识是否需要特定的,比如说,神经结构,或者意识是否可以通过不同方式实现。本文旨在基于当前对人类意识的研究,分析是否以及如何能够有一种针对该主题的实证和/或理论方法。