Alvarado Miriam, Penney Tarra L, Unwin Nigel, Murphy Madhuvanti M, Adams Jean
Centre for Diet and Activity Research, MRC Epidemiology Unit, University of Cambridge School of Clinical Medicine, Box 285 Institute of Metabolic Science, Cambridge Biomedical Campus, Cambridge CB2 0QQ, United Kingdom.
Global Health Program, Faculty of Health, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Canada.
Food Policy. 2021 Jul;102:102104. doi: 10.1016/j.foodpol.2021.102104.
Consuming sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) has been associated with increased rates of obesity and type 2 diabetes, making SSBs an increasingly popular target for taxation. In addition to changing prices, the introduction of an SSB tax may convey information about the health risks of SSBs (a signalling effect). If SSB taxation operates in part by producing a health risk signal, there may be important opportunities to amplify this effect. Our aim was to assess whether there is evidence of a risk signalling effect following the introduction of the Barbados SSB tax. We used process tracing to assess the existence of a signalling effect around sodas and sugar-sweetened juices (juice drinks). We used three data sources: 611 archived transcripts of local television news, 30 interviews with members of the public, and electronic point of sales data (46 months) from a major grocery store chain. We used directed content analysis to assess the qualitative data and an interrupted time series analysis to assess the quantitative data. We found evidence consistent with a risk signalling effect following the introduction of the SSB tax for sodas but not for juice drinks. Consistent with risk signalling theory, the findings suggest that consumers were aware of the tax, believed in a health rationale for the tax, understood that sodas were taxed and perceived that sodas and juice drinks were unhealthy. However consumers appear not to have understood that juice drinks were taxed, potentially reducing tax effectiveness from a health perspective. In addition, the tax may have incentivised companies to increase advertising around juice drinks (undermining any signalling effect) and to introduce low-cost SSB product lines. Policymakers can maximize the impact of risk signals by being clear about the definition of taxed SSBs, emphasizing the health rationale for introducing such a policy, and introducing co-interventions (e.g. marketing restrictions) that reduce opportunities for industry countersignals. These actions may amplify the impact of an SSB tax.
饮用含糖饮料(SSB)与肥胖率和2型糖尿病发病率的上升有关,这使得SSB成为越来越受欢迎的征税目标。除了改变价格外,征收SSB税可能会传达有关SSB健康风险的信息(信号效应)。如果SSB征税部分通过产生健康风险信号来发挥作用,那么可能存在放大这种效应的重要机会。我们的目的是评估在巴巴多斯实施SSB税后是否有风险信号效应的证据。我们使用过程追踪来评估围绕汽水和加糖果汁(果汁饮料)的信号效应的存在。我们使用了三个数据源:611份当地电视新闻存档文字记录、30次对公众的访谈以及一家大型连锁杂货店的电子销售点数据(46个月)。我们使用定向内容分析来评估定性数据,并使用中断时间序列分析来评估定量数据。我们发现,在实施汽水SSB税后有与风险信号效应一致的证据,但果汁饮料没有。与风险信号理论一致,研究结果表明消费者知道该税,相信征税有健康方面的理由,明白汽水被征税,并认为汽水和果汁饮料不健康。然而,消费者似乎不明白果汁饮料也被征税,这可能会从健康角度降低税收效果。此外,该税可能促使公司增加对果汁饮料的广告宣传(削弱任何信号效应),并推出低成本的SSB产品线。政策制定者可以通过明确征税的SSB的定义、强调引入此类政策的健康理由以及引入减少行业反信号机会的联合干预措施(如营销限制)来最大化风险信号的影响。这些行动可能会放大SSB税的影响。