Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Cleveland, OH, USA.
Clin Orthop Relat Res. 2022 Jan 1;480(1):8-22. doi: 10.1097/CORR.0000000000001981.
The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is the latest value-based payment program implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. As performance-based bonuses and penalties continue to rise in magnitude, it is essential to evaluate this program's ability to achieve its core objectives of quality improvement, cost reduction, and competition around clinically meaningful outcomes.
QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: We asked the following: (1) How do orthopaedic surgeons differ on the MIPS compared with surgeons in other specialties, both in terms of the MIPS scores and bonuses that derive from them? (2) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving penalties based on the MIPS? (3) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving a perfect score of 100 based on the MIPS?
Scores from the 2018 MIPS reporting period were linked to physician demographic and practice-based information using the Medicare Part B Provider Utilization and Payment File, the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System Data (NPPES), and National Physician Compare Database. For all orthopaedic surgeons identified within the Physician Compare Database, there were 15,210 MIPS scores identified, representing a 72% (15,210 of 21,124) participation rate in the 2018 MIPS. Those participating in the MIPS receive a final score (0 to 100, with 100 being a perfect score) based on a weighted calculation of performance metrics across four domains: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and costs. In 2018, orthopaedic surgeons had an overall mean ± SD score of 87 ± 21. From these scores, payment adjustments are determined in the following manner: scores less than 15 received a maximum penalty adjustment of -5% ("penalty"), scores equal to 15 did not receive an adjustment ("neutral"), scores between 15 and 70 received a positive adjustment ("positive"), and scores above 70 (maximum 100) received both a positive adjustment and an additional exceptional performance adjustment with a maximum adjustment of +5% ("bonus"). Adjustments among orthopaedic surgeons were compared across various demographic and practice characteristics. Both the mean MIPS score and the resulting payment adjustments were compared with a group of surgeons in other subspecialties. Finally, multivariable logistic regression models were generated to identify which variables were associated with increased odds of receiving a penalty as well as a perfect score of 100.
Compared with surgeons in other specialties, orthopaedic surgeons' mean MIPS score was 4.8 (95% CI 4.3 to 5.2; p < 0.001) points lower. From this difference, a lower proportion of orthopaedic surgeons received bonuses (-5.0% [95% CI -5.6 to -4.3]; p < 0.001), and a greater proportion received penalties (+0.5% [95% CI 0.2 to 0.8]; p < 0.001) and positive adjustments (+4.6% [95% CI 6.1 to 10.7]; p < 0.001) compared with surgeons in other specialties. After controlling for potentially confounding variables such as gender, years in practice, and practice setting, small (1 to 49 members) group size (adjusted odds ratio 22.2 [95% CI 8.17 to 60.3]; p < 0.001) and higher Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) scores (aOR 2.32 [95% CI 1.35 to 4.01]; p = 0.002) were associated with increased odds of a penalty. Also, after controlling for potential confounding, we found that reporting through an alternative payment model (aOR 28.7 [95% CI 24.0 to 34.3]; p < 0.001) was associated with increased odds of a perfect score, whereas small practice size (1 to 49 members) (aOR 0.35 [95% CI 0.31 to 0.39]; p < 0.001), a high patient volume (greater than 500 Medicare patients) (aOR 0.82 [95% CI 0.70 to 0.95]; p = 0.01), and higher HCC score (aOR 0.79 [95% Cl 0.66 to 0.93]; p = 0.006) were associated with decreased odds of a perfect MIPS score.
Collectively, orthopaedic surgeons performed well in the second year of the MIPS, with 87% earning bonus payments. Among participating orthopaedic surgeons, individual reporting affiliation, small practice size, and more medically complex patient populations were associated with higher odds of receiving penalties and lower odds of earning a perfect score. Based on these findings, we recommend that individuals and orthopaedic surgeons in small group practices strive to forge partnerships with larger hospital practices with adequate ancillary staff to support quality reporting initiatives. Such partnerships may help relieve surgeons of growing administrative obligations and allow for maintained focus on direct patient care activities. Policymakers should aim to produce a shortened panel of performance measures to ensure more standardized comparison and less time and energy diverted from established clinical workflows. The current MIPS scoring methodology should also be amended with a complexity modifier to ensure fair evaluation of surgeons practicing in the safety net setting, or those treating patients with a high comorbidity burden.
Level III, therapeutic study.
基于价值的支付计划(MIPS)是医疗保险和医疗补助服务中心实施的最新基于价值的支付计划。随着基于绩效的奖金和罚款的规模不断增加,评估该计划在提高质量、降低成本和围绕有临床意义的结果进行竞争方面实现其核心目标的能力至关重要。
问题/目的:我们提出了以下问题:(1)与其他专业的外科医生相比,骨科医生在 MIPS 方面的表现如何,无论是在 MIPS 得分还是由此产生的奖金方面?(2)哪些外科医生和实践的特征与基于 MIPS 的处罚有关?(3)哪些外科医生和实践的特征与基于 MIPS 的满分 100 分有关?
利用医疗保险部分 B 提供者使用和支付文件、国家计划和提供者登记系统数据(NPPES)和国家医师比较数据库,将 2018 年 MIPS 报告期的分数与医生的人口统计学和实践相关信息联系起来。在医师比较数据库中确定的所有骨科医生中,有 15210 个 MIPS 分数,代表 72%(15210 个中的 15210 个)参与了 2018 年 MIPS。参与 MIPS 的人会根据四个领域的绩效指标加权计算得出最终分数(0 到 100,满分 100):质量、促进互操作性、改进活动和成本。2018 年,骨科医生的平均得分为 87 ± 21。根据这些分数,将在以下方式确定付款调整:得分低于 15 分的人将获得最大的 5%的处罚调整(“处罚”),得分等于 15 分的人不进行调整(“中性”),得分在 15 到 70 分之间的人将获得正调整(“正”),得分高于 70 分(最高 100 分)的人将同时获得正调整和额外的卓越绩效调整,最高调整幅度为 5%(“奖金”)。在各种人口统计学和实践特征方面比较了骨科医生之间的调整。将 MIPS 的平均分数和由此产生的付款调整与其他专业的一组外科医生进行了比较。最后,生成多变量逻辑回归模型,以确定哪些变量与获得处罚的几率增加以及获得满分 100 分的几率增加有关。
与其他专业的外科医生相比,骨科医生的平均 MIPS 分数低 4.8 分(95%置信区间 4.3 至 5.2;p < 0.001)。从这个差异中,较低比例的骨科医生获得了奖金(-5.0%[95%置信区间-5.6 至-4.3];p < 0.001),而较高比例的医生获得了处罚(+0.5%[95%置信区间 0.2 至 0.8];p < 0.001)和正调整(+4.6%[95%置信区间 6.1 至 10.7];p < 0.001),而不是其他专业的外科医生。在控制性别、从业年限和实践环境等潜在混杂变量后,小(1 至 49 名成员)组规模(调整后的优势比 22.2[95%置信区间 8.17 至 60.3];p < 0.001)和更高的层次条件类别(HCC)评分(优势比 2.32[95%置信区间 1.35 至 4.01];p = 0.002)与获得处罚的几率增加有关。此外,在控制潜在混杂因素后,我们发现通过替代支付模式进行报告(优势比 28.7[95%置信区间 24.0 至 34.3];p < 0.001)与获得满分的几率增加有关,而小的实践规模(1 至 49 名成员)(优势比 0.35[95%置信区间 0.31 至 0.39];p < 0.001)、较高的患者量(>500 名 Medicare 患者)(优势比 0.82[95%置信区间 0.70 至 0.95];p = 0.01)和更高的 HCC 评分(优势比 0.79[95%置信区间 0.66 至 0.93];p = 0.006)与获得满分的几率降低有关。
总体而言,骨科医生在 MIPS 的第二年表现良好,87%的人获得了奖金支付。在参与的骨科医生中,个人报告的隶属关系、小的实践规模和更多的医疗复杂患者群体与获得处罚的几率较高和获得满分的几率较低有关。基于这些发现,我们建议个人和小型团体实践中的骨科医生努力与拥有足够辅助人员的大型医院实践建立合作伙伴关系,以支持质量报告倡议。这种合作关系可能有助于减轻外科医生日益增加的行政负担,并使他们能够继续专注于直接的患者护理活动。政策制定者应努力制定一个更短的绩效衡量标准,以确保更标准化的比较,并减少从既定临床工作流程中转移的时间和精力。目前的 MIPS 评分方法也应进行修正,增加复杂性修正因子,以确保在安全网环境中执业的外科医生或治疗患有高合并症负担的患者的外科医生得到公平评估。
III 级,治疗性研究。