Chen Yen-Hung, Lai Yuan-Cheng, Zhou Kai-Zhong
Department of Information Management, National Taipei University of Nursing and Health Sciences, Taipei 112, Taiwan.
Department of Information Management, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, Taipei 106, Taiwan.
Micromachines (Basel). 2021 Aug 26;12(9):1019. doi: 10.3390/mi12091019.
The Deterministic Network (DetNet) is becoming a major feature for 5G and 6G networks to cope with the issue that conventional IT infrastructure cannot efficiently handle latency-sensitive data. The DetNet applies flow virtualization to satisfy time-critical flow requirements, but inevitably, DetNet flows and conventional flows interact/interfere with each other when sharing the same physical resources. This subsequently raises the hybrid DDoS security issue that high malicious traffic not only attacks the DetNet centralized controller itself but also attacks the links that DetNet flows pass through. Previous research focused on either the DDoS type of the centralized controller side or the link side. As DDoS attack techniques are evolving, Hybrid DDoS attacks can attack multiple targets (controllers or links) simultaneously, which are difficultly detected by previous DDoS detection methodologies. This study, therefore, proposes a Flow Differentiation Detector (FDD), a novel approach to detect Hybrid DDoS attacks. The FDD first applies a fuzzy-based mechanism, Target Link Selection, to determine the most valuable links for the DDoS link/server attacker and then statistically evaluates the traffic pattern flowing through these links. Furthermore, the contribution of this study is to deploy the FDD in the SDN controller OpenDayLight to implement a Hybrid DDoS attack detection system. The experimental results show that the FDD has superior detection accuracy (above 90%) than traditional methods under the situation of different ratios of Hybrid DDoS attacks and different types and scales of topology.
确定性网络(DetNet)正成为5G和6G网络的一项主要特性,以应对传统IT基础设施无法有效处理对延迟敏感数据的问题。DetNet应用流虚拟化来满足对时间要求严格的流需求,但不可避免地,当DetNet流和传统流共享相同物理资源时,它们会相互交互/干扰。这随后引发了混合分布式拒绝服务(DDoS)安全问题,即大量恶意流量不仅会攻击DetNet集中控制器本身,还会攻击DetNet流所经过的链路。先前的研究要么聚焦于集中控制器端的DDoS类型,要么聚焦于链路端。随着DDoS攻击技术的不断演变,混合DDoS攻击可以同时攻击多个目标(控制器或链路),而这是先前的DDoS检测方法难以检测到的。因此,本研究提出了一种流区分检测器(FDD),这是一种检测混合DDoS攻击的新颖方法。FDD首先应用一种基于模糊的机制——目标链路选择,来确定对于DDoS链路/服务器攻击者而言最有价值的链路,然后对流经这些链路的流量模式进行统计评估。此外,本研究的贡献在于将FDD部署在软件定义网络(SDN)控制器OpenDayLight中,以实现一个混合DDoS攻击检测系统。实验结果表明,在混合DDoS攻击比例不同以及拓扑类型和规模不同的情况下,FDD的检测准确率(高于90%)优于传统方法。