Wallner Michael
Department of Philosophy, University of Graz, Heinrichstraße 26, 8010 Graz, Austria.
Synthese. 2021;198(Suppl 6):1257-1277. doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1856-y. Epub 2018 Jun 26.
This paper is about the so-called meta-grounding question, i.e. the question of what grounds grounding facts of the sort ' is grounded in '. An answer to this question is pressing since some plausible assumptions about grounding and fundamentality entail that grounding facts must be grounded. There are three different accounts on the market which each answer the meta-grounding question differently: Bennett's and deRosset's "Straight Forward Account" (SFA), Litland's "Zero-Grounding Account" (ZGA), and "Grounding Essentialism" (GE). I argue that if grounding is to be regarded as metaphysical explanation (i.e. if is true), (GE) is to be preferred over (ZGA) and (SFA) as only (GE) is compatible with a crucial consequence of the thought that grounding metaphysical explanation. In this manner the paper contributes not only to discussions about the ground of ground but also to the ongoing debate concerning the relationship between ground, essence, and explanation.
本文探讨的是所谓的元奠基问题，即那种“……基于……”的奠基事实的依据是什么的问题。对这个问题的回答十分紧迫，因为一些关于奠基和基础性的合理假设意味着奠基事实必须有其依据。目前市面上有三种不同的解释，它们对元奠基问题的回答各不相同：贝内特和德罗塞特的“直接解释”（SFA）、利特兰的“零奠基解释”（ZGA）以及“奠基本质主义”（GE）。我认为，如果奠基要被视为形而上学解释（即如果……为真），那么（GE）比（ZGA）和（SFA）更可取，因为只有（GE）与奠基即形而上学解释这一观点的一个关键结论相兼容。通过这种方式，本文不仅有助于关于奠基之依据的讨论，也有助于正在进行的关于奠基、本质和解释之间关系的辩论。
