Dörre Steffen
Institut für Geschichte der Medizin, JLU Gießen, Gießen, Deutschland.
NTM. 2021 Dec;29(4):417-446. doi: 10.1007/s00048-021-00318-3. Epub 2021 Nov 10.
This paper examines the shifts in Alexander Mitscherlich's epistemological position in the 1940s, 50s and 60s via his plea for psychosomatic medicine. These shifts illustrate the post-war controversy among psychiatrists, physicians, and psychotherapists about what constitutes valid and practically relevant knowledge. The subjectivity of patients is key to Mitscherlich's concept of disease. This informs his continuous criticism of the use of statistical methods to validate individual diagnoses and hypotheses. This paper shows that Mitscherlich's criticism of a science-based medical methodology is highly adaptable, even though, in spite of many theoretical changes and adaptations, the main thrust of his approach remains consistent.
本文通过亚历山大·米切利希对身心医学的呼吁,审视了他在20世纪40年代、50年代和60年代认识论立场的转变。这些转变说明了战后精神科医生、内科医生和心理治疗师之间关于什么构成有效且具有实际相关性的知识的争论。患者的主观性是米切利希疾病概念的关键。这使他不断批评使用统计方法来验证个体诊断和假设。本文表明,尽管米切利希对基于科学的医学方法论的批评经历了许多理论变化和调整,但其主要观点仍保持一致,具有很强的适应性。