Interdisciplinary Centre for Ethics and Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Poland; Institute of Philosophy, Vilnius University, Lithuania; Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes, France.
Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes, France; Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany; Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University, Taiwan.
Conscious Cogn. 2021 Nov;96:103240. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103240. Epub 2021 Nov 18.
A striking feature of our memories of the personal past is that they involve different visual perspectives: one sometimes recalls past events from one's original point of view (a field perspective), but one sometimes recalls them from an external point of view (an observer perspective). In philosophy, observer memories are often seen as being less than fully genuine and as being necessarily false or distorted. This paper looks at whether laypeople share the standard philosophical view by applying the methods of experimental philosophy. We report the results of five studies suggesting that, while participants clearly categorize both field and observer memories as memories, they tend to judge that observer memories are slightly less accurate than field memories. Our results suggest, however, that in lay thought, the difference between field and observer memories is not nearly as clear-cut as philosophers have generally taken it to be.
我们对个人过去的记忆的一个显著特点是,它们涉及不同的视觉视角:有时人们会从自己原来的视角(场视角)回忆过去的事件,但有时人们会从外部视角(观察者视角)回忆过去的事件。在哲学中,观察者记忆通常被认为不够真实,而且必然是虚假或扭曲的。本文通过应用实验哲学的方法,探讨了是否普通人也认同这种标准的哲学观点。我们报告了五项研究的结果,这些研究表明,尽管参与者清楚地将场记忆和观察者记忆都归类为记忆,但他们往往认为观察者记忆比场记忆稍微不准确。然而,我们的结果表明,在普通人的思维中,场记忆和观察者记忆之间的区别并不像哲学家通常认为的那样明显。