Institute for History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto, Canada.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2022 Feb;91:103-112. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.11.016. Epub 2021 Dec 9.
Recent philosophical literature has turned its attention towards assessments of how to judge scientific proposals as worthy of further inquiry. Previous work, as well as papers contained within this special issue, propose criteria for pursuitworthiness (Achinstein, 1993; Whitt, 1992; DiMarco & Khalifa, 2019; Laudan, 1977; Shan, 2020; Šešelja et al., 2012). The purpose of this paper is to assess the grounds on which pursuitworthiness demands can be legitimately made. To do this, I propose a challenge to the possibility of even minimal criteria of pursuitworthiness, inspired by Paul Feyerabend. I go on to provide a framework for identifying the contexts in which pursuitworthiness criteria may promote the efficiency of scientific inquiry. I then spell out some implications this framework has for values and pursuit.
最近的哲学文献将注意力转向了如何评估科学提案，以判断其是否值得进一步研究。以前的工作，以及本期特刊中的一些论文，都提出了值得追求的标准（Achinstein, 1993; Whitt, 1992; DiMarco & Khalifa, 2019; Laudan, 1977; Shan, 2020; Šešelja et al., 2012）。本文旨在评估可以合法提出值得追求的标准的依据。为此，我受到保罗·费耶阿本德（Paul Feyerabend）的启发，对追求标准的最低限度标准的可能性提出了质疑。接着，我提供了一个框架，用于确定追求标准在哪些情况下可能会促进科学探究的效率。然后，我阐述了这一框架对价值观和追求的一些影响。
