de Weerd Christian R, Dung Leonard
Centre for Philosophy and AI Research (PAIR), University of Erlangen-Nürnberg (FAU).
Institute of Philosophy II, Ruhr-University Bochum.
Cogn Sci. 2025 Mar;49(3):e70053. doi: 10.1111/cogs.70053.
There is much interest in investigating the evolution question: How did consciousness evolve? In this paper, we evaluate the role that evolutionary considerations can play in justifying (i.e., confirming or falsifying) hypotheses about the origin, nature, and function of consciousness. Specifically, we argue against what we call evolution-first approaches to consciousness, according to which evolutionary considerations provide the primary and foundational lens through which we should assess hypotheses about the nature, function, or distribution of consciousness. Based on the example of Walter Veit's account and additional reasoning, we contend that evolution-first approaches struggle to provide compelling empirical evidence for their key claims about consciousness. In contrast with these approaches, we argue that consciousness science needs to foundationally rely on experimental and observational evidence from humans and other present-day animals. If our arguments succeed, then researchers, when investigating consciousness, are better advised to take as their primary source of evidence consciousness' present, not its past. Having said this, we acknowledge that evolutionary thinking plays an important role in consciousness science. We delineate this role by stressing several ways in which evolutionary considerations can substantially help advance consciousness research, although in a manner that avoids the evolution-first approach. Since our argument only concerns the assessment of hypotheses (the "context of justification"), it leaves it open which role evolutionary considerations play in generating hypotheses (the "context of discovery"). That is, evolutionary considerations may nevertheless play a foundational role in hypothesis generation in consciousness science.
意识是如何进化的？在本文中，我们评估进化考量在证明（即证实或证伪）关于意识的起源、本质和功能的假设时所能发挥的作用。具体而言，我们反对我们所称的意识研究的进化优先方法，根据这种方法，进化考量提供了主要的和基础性的视角，通过这个视角我们应该评估关于意识的本质、功能或分布的假设。基于沃尔特·维特的观点及其他推理的例子，我们认为进化优先方法难以就其关于意识的关键主张提供令人信服的经验证据。与这些方法不同，我们认为意识科学需要从根本上依赖来自人类和其他现存动物的实验和观察证据。如果我们的论证成功，那么研究人员在探究意识时，最好将意识的当下而非过去作为主要证据来源。话虽如此，我们承认进化思维在意识科学中发挥着重要作用。我们通过强调进化考量能够在很大程度上帮助推进意识研究的几种方式来阐述这一作用，尽管是以避免进化优先方法的方式。由于我们的论证仅涉及假设的评估（“证明的语境”），所以关于进化考量在生成假设（“发现的语境”）中所起的作用仍未明确。也就是说，进化考量在意识科学的假设生成中仍可能发挥基础性作用。
