Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK.
Soc Stud Sci. 2022 Feb;52(1):53-78. doi: 10.1177/03063127211062586. Epub 2021 Dec 29.
This article presents a preliminary analysis of the advice provided by the UK government's Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) held between 22 January and 23 March 2020 in response to the emerging coronavirus pandemic. Drawing on the published minutes of the group's meetings, the article examines what was known and not known, the assumptions and working practices that shaped their work, and how this knowledge was reflected in the decisions made by the government. In doing so, the article critically examines what it means for policy making to be 'led by the science' when the best available science is provisional and uncertain. Using ideas of 'externality' and 'evidential significance', the article argues that the apparent desire for high levels of certainty by both scientists and political decision-makers made early action impossible as the data needed were not, and could not be, available in time. This leads to an argument for changes to the institutions that provide scientific advice based on sociologically informed expectations of science in which expert judgement plays a more significant role.
本文对英国政府紧急情况科学咨询小组(SAGE)于 2020 年 1 月 22 日至 3 月 23 日期间针对新出现的冠状病毒大流行提供的建议进行了初步分析。本文利用该小组会议的已发表记录,探讨了已知和未知的情况、塑造其工作的假设和工作实践,以及这些知识如何反映在政府做出的决策中。通过这样做,本文批判性地审视了当最佳可用科学具有临时性和不确定性时,“以科学为导向”的政策制定意味着什么。本文使用“外部性”和“证据意义”的概念,认为科学家和政治决策者都明显希望获得高度确定性,这使得早期行动变得不可能,因为所需的数据没有及时出现,也无法及时出现。这导致人们呼吁根据对科学的社会学预期对提供科学建议的机构进行改革,在这种预期中,专家判断发挥更重要的作用。