Albert Gnaegi Center for Health Care Ethics, Salus Center, Saint Louis University, Saint Louis, Missouri.
Bioethics. 2022 Mar;36(3):283-289. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12996. Epub 2021 Dec 30.
Empathy is generally considered important because it is linked to prosocial helping behaviors. To the extent that humans are thought to be social creatures, empathy is regarded as an important component of our general well-being. Meanwhile, empathy skeptics argue that empathy is not as important as its proponents believe. While there is philosophical debate about the appropriate place for empathy in moral judgment, empathy is a taken-for-granted, good-making feature of moral deliberation in healthcare. In this paper I offer an account of empathy and a critique of its moral significance before thinking specifically about the role that empathy plays in medicine. Finally, I offer a hypothetical case to show that in order to fully appreciate the skeptical position, empathy's role in health justice should be understood in the context of structural injustice. Although I ultimately defend the importance of empathy in healthcare environments, I show that any conception of empathy in healthcare should take seriously reasons for skepticism about empathy, notably its susceptibility to bias against disfavored groups.
同理心通常被认为很重要,因为它与亲社会的帮助行为有关。在某种程度上,人类被认为是社会性的生物,同理心被视为我们整体幸福感的重要组成部分。与此同时,同理心怀疑论者认为同理心并不像其支持者认为的那么重要。虽然哲学上存在关于同理心在道德判断中的适当位置的争论,但同理心是医疗保健中道德思考中理所当然的、善的特征。在本文中,我提供了对同理心的解释,并对其道德意义进行了批判,然后再具体思考同理心在医学中的作用。最后,我提供了一个假设案例,以表明为了充分理解怀疑论者的立场,同理心在健康正义中的作用应该在结构性不公正的背景下加以理解。尽管我最终为同理心在医疗保健环境中的重要性进行了辩护,但我表明,医疗保健中同理心的任何概念都应认真对待对同理心的怀疑理由,特别是同理心易受对不受欢迎群体的偏见的影响。