Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tinbergen Institute Netherlands.
School of Economics, University of the Philippines Diliman Philippines.
J Health Econ. 2022 Jan;81:102580. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102580. Epub 2021 Dec 24.
Temporary incentives are offered in anticipation of persistent effects that are seldom estimated. We use a nationwide randomized experiment in the Philippines to estimate effects of two incentives for health insurance three years after their withdrawal. We find that both temporary incentives had persistent effects on enrollment. A premium subsidy had a small but highly persistent effect. Application assistance offered to those initially unresponsive to the subsidy had a much larger but less persistent effect. The subsidy persuaded those with higher initial stated willingness to pay to enroll and keep enrolling. The offer of application assistance to initial non-compliers with the subsidy achieved a larger immediate effect by drawing in those who stated they valued insurance less and were less likely to re-enroll when the incentives were withdrawn.
我们提供临时性激励措施,以期产生持久效果,但这些效果很少被估计到。我们在菲律宾开展了一项全国范围的随机试验,以估计在撤销两项医疗保险激励措施三年后的效果。我们发现,这两项临时性激励措施对参保率都有持久影响。保费补贴有较小但高度持久的效果。向最初对补贴无反应的人提供申请援助,产生了更大但持续时间较短的效果。补贴促使那些最初表示愿意支付更高保费的人参保并保持参保。向最初不遵守补贴规定的人提供申请援助的提议,通过吸引那些表示对保险的价值较低且在激励措施取消后不太可能续保的人,产生了更大的即时效果。