The Limitations of Social Science as the Arbiter of Blame: An Argument for Abandoning Retribution.

The U.S. criminal-justice system has consequentialist and retributivist goals: It considers what is best for society as well as how to punish people in a manner proportional to their crimes. In deciding on the degree of retribution that is called for, the system attempts to determine the blameworthiness-or culpability-of the people involved, weighing factors such as their ability to think rationality, their freedom from coercion, and whether their actions were out of character. These determinations hinge on social-scientific research that is not strong enough to justify such decisions. In this article, I challenge the social-scientific basis for determining culpability on three grounds: replicability, generalizability, and inferential strength. In light of the limitations of this research, I argue that the criminal-justice system should abandon its retributive goals and pursue a more consequentialist-and more reparative-form of justice.