School of Economics and Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, Jiangsu, 221116, People's Republic of China.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2022 Jun;29(27):41386-41408. doi: 10.1007/s11356-021-18450-x. Epub 2022 Jan 28.
The ecological transformation of the mineral resource-based cities (MRBCs) is the key to promoting the construction of ecological civilization and realizing the sustainable development of the social economy and society in China. Existing research ignores the influence of public participation on other subjects in the process of transformation, which is essential to solve the dilemma faced by the ecological transformation of MRBCs. In view of this, from the perspective of stakeholders, this study constructs a new evolutionary game model, which is jointly participated in by the government, enterprises, and social factors (SF) (including public, self-media, and non-governmental organizations). This paper discusses the interests of the main parties and their inter-relationships and reveals the causal mechanism and influencing factors of the dilemma of the ecological transformation of the MRBCs. Our results demonstrate that the evolution and convergence of strategies among the tripartite game agents exhibit strong interaction. First, the single industrial structure, low regulatory efficiency, and weak ecological awareness substantially increase the cost of transformation, thus exacerbating the dilemma of MRBC transformation. Second, the transformation intensity and comprehensive income are important factors affecting the transformation, and the effect intensity of influencing factors in different transition stages is different, which implies that the focus of policies in different stages is different. Third, in the process of promoting enterprise ecological transformation, government supervision and SF supervision have significant complementary effects. However, high-intensity supervision has a significant crowding-out effect on the willingness of SF to participate. Therefore, the government needs to balance the intensity of supervision and willingness of SF to participate. Compared with the existing research, this study comprehensively reflects the complex dynamic game process of the ecological transformation of MRBCs in China and can provide a reference for the policy of promoting the ecological transformation of MRBCs in China.
矿业资源型城市(MRBCs)的生态转型是促进中国生态文明建设和实现社会经济社会可持续发展的关键。现有研究忽视了公众参与在转型过程中对其他主体的影响,这对于解决 MRBC 生态转型所面临的困境至关重要。有鉴于此,本研究从利益相关者的角度构建了一个新的演化博弈模型,该模型由政府、企业和社会因素(SF)(包括公众、自媒体和非政府组织)共同参与。本文讨论了主要各方的利益及其相互关系,揭示了 MRBC 生态转型困境的因果机制和影响因素。研究结果表明,三方博弈主体策略的演化和收敛具有很强的相互作用。首先,单一的产业结构、低监管效率和薄弱的生态意识极大地增加了转型成本,从而加剧了 MRBC 转型的困境。其次,转型强度和综合收益是影响转型的重要因素,不同转型阶段影响因素的作用强度不同,这意味着不同阶段政策的重点不同。第三,在推动企业生态转型过程中,政府监管和 SF 监管具有显著的互补效应。然而,高强度的监管对 SF 参与意愿具有显著的挤出效应。因此,政府需要平衡监管强度和 SF 参与意愿。与现有研究相比,本研究全面反映了中国 MRBC 生态转型的复杂动态博弈过程,可为中国推动 MRBC 生态转型的政策提供参考。