Warner Calvin H
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235 USA.
Philosophia (Ramat Gan). 2022;50(3):1503-1513. doi: 10.1007/s11406-021-00459-8. Epub 2022 Jan 31.
In "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," John Rawls suggests an approach to a public conception of justice that eschews any dependence on metaphysical conceptions of justice in favor of a political conception of justice. This means that if there is a metaphysical conception of justice that actually obtains, then Rawls' theory would not (and could not) be sensitive to it. Rawls himself admitted in Political Liberalism that "the political conception does without the truth." Similarly, in Law of Peoples, Rawls endorses a political conception of justice to govern the society of peoples that is not concerned with truth, but instead concerned with being sufficiently neutral so as to avoid conflict with any reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The odd result is that this neutrality excludes any conception of truth at all. Therefore, in times of crisis that demand incisive decision making based on scientific, economic or moral considerations, public reason will stall because it can contain no coherent conception of truth.
在《作为公平的正义:政治的而非形而上学的》一文中,约翰·罗尔斯提出了一种关于正义的公共观念的方法,该方法摒弃了对形而上学正义观念的任何依赖,转而支持一种政治正义观念。这意味着,如果存在一种实际成立的形而上学正义观念,那么罗尔斯的理论不会(也不可能)对其敏感。罗尔斯本人在《政治自由主义》中承认,“政治观念无需真理”。同样,在《万民法》中,罗尔斯支持一种政治正义观念来治理万民社会,这种观念不关注真理,而是关注足够中立,以避免与任何合理的综合性学说发生冲突。奇怪的结果是,这种中立性完全排除了任何真理观念。因此,在需要基于科学、经济或道德考量做出敏锐决策的危机时刻,公共理性将会停滞,因为它无法包含连贯的真理观念。