School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China.
School of Finance, Beijing College of Finance and Commerce, Beijing, China.
Front Public Health. 2022 Jan 26;9:812253. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2021.812253. eCollection 2021.
This paper studies whether the market can recognize the value of corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure, board structure, and managerial incentives) of Chinese listed companies. We find that when companies are faced with "black swan" events, such as COVID-19, non-state-owned enterprise are found to be more valuable, that is, the stock price of non-state-owned enterprises are more immune to the negative shocks of COVID-19. For board structure, the arrangement of the duality of chairman and CEO is found to be more valuable and can effectively alleviate the negative shocks of the epidemic on the stock price. For managerial incentives mechanisms, it shows that management shareholding, management compensation, and executive stock options are all effective mechanisms and can better withstand the negative shocks of the COVID-19 epidemic on the stock price of companies. This paper sheds light on the value of corporate governance mechanisms in the Chinese capital market from the perspective of investors, which enriches literature in the field of corporate governance.
本文研究了市场是否能识别中国上市公司治理机制（股权结构、董事会结构和管理层激励）的价值。我们发现，当公司面临“黑天鹅”事件（如新冠疫情）时，非国有企业被发现更具价值，即非国有企业的股价对新冠疫情的负面冲击更具免疫力。对于董事会结构，发现董事长和首席执行官的双重身份安排更具价值，并能有效缓解疫情对股价的负面影响。对于管理层激励机制，研究表明，管理层持股、管理层薪酬和高管股票期权都是有效的机制，可以更好地抵御新冠疫情对公司股价的负面影响。本文从投资者的角度探讨了中国资本市场治理机制的价值，丰富了公司治理领域的文献。
