Reutlinger Alexander
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Ludwigstr. 31, 80539, München, Germany.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2022 Apr;92:152-161. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.01.018. Epub 2022 Feb 16.
Solving the "new demarcation problem" requires a distinction between epistemically legitimate and illegitimate roles for non-epistemic values in science. This paper addresses one 'half' (i.e. a sub-problem) of the new demarcation problem articulated by the Gretchenfrage: What makes the role of a non-epistemic value in science epistemically illegitimate? I will argue for the Explaining Epistemic Errors (EEE) account, according to which the epistemically illegitimate role of a non-epistemic value is defined via an explanatory claim: the fact that an epistemic agent is motivated by a non-epistemic value explains why the epistemic agent commits a particular epistemic error. The EEE account is inspired by Douglas' and Steel's "functionalist" or "epistemic constraint" accounts of epistemic illegitimacy. I will suggest that the EEE account is able to meet two challenges that these two accounts face, while preserving the key intuition underlying both accounts. If my arguments succeed, then the EEE account provides a solution to one half of the new demarcation problem (by providing a definition of what makes the role of a non-epistemic value epistemically illegitimate) and it opens up new ways for addressing the other half (i.e. characterizing an epistemically legitimate role for non-epistemic values).
解决“新划界问题”需要区分科学中非认知价值在认知上合法与不合法的作用。本文探讨了由“格雷琴问题”提出的新划界问题的一个“半边”（即一个子问题）：科学中非认知价值的作用在认知上不合法的原因是什么？我将论证“解释认知错误”（EEE）解释，根据这一解释，非认知价值在认知上不合法的作用是通过一个解释性主张来定义的：认知主体受非认知价值驱动这一事实解释了该认知主体为何会犯特定的认知错误。EEE解释的灵感来源于道格拉斯和斯蒂尔关于认知不合法性的“功能主义”或“认知约束”解释。我将表明，EEE解释能够应对这两种解释所面临的两个挑战，同时保留这两种解释背后的关键直觉。如果我的论证成功，那么EEE解释就为新划界问题的一个半边提供了一个解决方案（通过给出使非认知价值的作用在认知上不合法的定义），并且为解决另一个半边（即刻画非认知价值在认知上合法的作用）开辟了新途径。
