Hiragi Shusuke, Hatanaka Jun, Sugiyama Osamu, Saito Kenichi, Nambu Masayuki, Kuroda Tomohiro
Division of Medical Informatics and Administration Planning, Kyoto University Hospital, Kyoto, Japan.
Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan.
JMIR Form Res. 2022 Mar 4;6(3):e28877. doi: 10.2196/28877.
Hospital bed management is an important resource allocation task in hospital management, but currently, it is a challenging task. However, acquiring an optimal solution is also difficult because intraorganizational information asymmetry exists. Signaling, as defined in the fields of economics, can be used to mitigate this problem.
We aimed to develop an assignment process that is based on a token economy as signaling intermediary.
We implemented a game-like simulation, representing token economy-based bed assignments, in which 3 players act as ward managers of 3 inpatient wards (1 each). As a preliminary evaluation, we recruited 9 nurse managers to play and then participate in a survey about qualitative perceptions for current and proposed methods (7-point Likert scale). We also asked them about preferred rewards for collected tokens. In addition, we quantitatively recorded participant pricing behavior.
Participants scored the token economy-method positively in staff satisfaction (3.89 points vs 2.67 points) and patient safety (4.38 points vs 3.50 points) compared to the current method, but they scored the proposed method negatively for managerial rivalry, staff employee development, and benefit for patients. The majority of participants (7 out of 9) listed human resources as the preferred reward for tokens. There were slight associations between workload information and pricing.
Survey results indicate that the proposed method can improve staff satisfaction and patient safety by increasing the decision-making autonomy of staff but may also increase managerial rivalry, as expected from existing criticism for decentralized decision-making. Participant behavior indicated that token-based pricing can act as a signaling intermediary. Given responses related to rewards, a token system that is designed to incorporate human resource allocation is a promising method. Based on aforementioned discussion, we concluded that a token economy-based bed allocation system has the potential to be an optimal method by mitigating information asymmetry.
病床管理是医院管理中一项重要的资源分配任务,但目前它是一项具有挑战性的任务。然而,由于组织内部存在信息不对称,获取最优解决方案也很困难。经济学领域所定义的信号传递可用于缓解这一问题。
我们旨在开发一种基于代币经济作为信号中介的分配流程。
我们实施了一个类似游戏的模拟,代表基于代币经济的病床分配,其中3名参与者分别担任3个住院病房(各1个)的病房经理。作为初步评估,我们招募了9名护士长参与游戏,然后参加一项关于对当前方法和提议方法的定性看法的调查(7点李克特量表)。我们还询问了他们对收集代币的首选奖励。此外,我们定量记录了参与者的定价行为。
与当前方法相比,参与者对代币经济方法在员工满意度(3.89分对2.67分)和患者安全(4.38分对3.50分)方面给予了积极评价,但他们对提议方法在管理竞争、员工发展和患者受益方面给予了消极评价。大多数参与者(9人中有7人)将人力资源列为代币的首选奖励。工作量信息与定价之间存在轻微关联。
调查结果表明,提议的方法可以通过增加员工的决策自主权来提高员工满意度和患者安全,但也可能如对分散决策的现有批评所预期的那样增加管理竞争。参与者的行为表明基于代币的定价可以作为一种信号中介。鉴于与奖励相关的回答,设计用于纳入人力资源分配的代币系统是一种有前景的方法。基于上述讨论,我们得出结论,基于代币经济的病床分配系统有可能通过缓解信息不对称成为一种最优方法。