Stephen M. Ross School of Business.
Leonard N. Stern School of Business.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 2022 Oct;123(4):676-692. doi: 10.1037/pspa0000303. Epub 2022 Apr 21.
[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 123(4) of (see record 2023-02979-002). In the article, the affiliation information for Alixandra Barasch and Deborah A. Small has been updated and now appears in the author note. All versions of this article have been corrected.] The widespread demand for luxury is best understood by the social advantages of signaling status (i.e., conspicuous consumption; Veblen, 1899). In the present research, we examine the limits of this perspective by studying the implications of status signaling for cooperation. Cooperation is principally about caring for others, which is fundamentally at odds with the self-promotional nature of signaling status. Across behaviorally consequential Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games and naturalistic scenario studies, we investigate both sides of the relationship between signaling and cooperation: (a) how people respond to others who signal status, as well as (b) the strategic choices people make about whether to signal status. In each case, we find that people recognize the relative advantage of modesty (i.e., the inverse of signaling status) and behave strategically to enable cooperation. That is, people are less likely to cooperate with partners who signal status compared to those who are modest (Studies 1 and 2), and more likely to select a modest person when cooperation is desirable (Study 3). These behaviors are consistent with inferences that status signalers are less prosocial and less prone to cooperate. Importantly, people also refrain from signaling status themselves when it is strategically beneficial to appear cooperative (Studies 4-6). Together, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the conditions under which the reputational costs of conspicuous consumption outweigh its benefits, helping integrate theoretical perspectives on strategic interpersonal dynamics, cooperation, and status signaling. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
[勘误通知：（参见第 123 卷（4）中的记录 2023-02979-002），本文的勘误报告已发布。在本文中，作者的联系信息已更新，现在出现在作者注释中。本文的所有版本都已更正。] 对奢侈品的广泛需求可以通过信号地位的社会优势（即炫耀性消费；凡勃伦，1899）来最好地理解。在本研究中，我们通过研究地位信号对合作的影响来检验这种观点的局限性。合作主要是关于关心他人的，这与信号地位的自我宣传性质从根本上是相悖的。在具有行为后果的囚徒困境（PD）游戏和自然情景研究中，我们研究了信号传递与合作之间的关系的两个方面：（a）人们如何回应信号地位的他人，以及（b）人们在是否信号地位方面做出的策略选择。在每种情况下，我们发现人们都认识到谦逊的相对优势（即信号地位的反面），并进行策略性选择以促进合作。也就是说，与谦逊的合作伙伴相比，人们不太可能与信号地位的合作伙伴合作（研究 1 和 2），并且在合作是可取的情况下更有可能选择谦逊的人（研究 3）。这些行为与信号发送者不太具有亲社会和不太可能合作的推断一致。重要的是，当表现出合作的策略性好处时，人们自己也会避免信号地位（研究 4-6）。总的来说，我们的发现有助于更好地理解炫耀性消费的声誉成本超过其收益的条件，有助于整合关于战略人际动态、合作和地位信号的理论观点。（PsycInfo 数据库记录（c）2022 APA，保留所有权利）。
