Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow, G12 8QQ, Glasgow, Scotland.
Med Health Care Philos. 2022 Jun;25(2):281-288. doi: 10.1007/s11019-022-10075-2. Epub 2022 Apr 26.
In work on the ethics of cognitive enhancement use, there is a pervasive concern that such enhancement will-in some way-make us less authentic (e.g., Bublitz and Merkel 2009; Juth 2011). Attempts to clarify what this concern amounts to and how to respond to it often lead to debates on the nature of the "true self" (e.g., Maslen et al. 2014) and what constitutes "genuine human activity" (e.g., Kass 2003). This paper shows that a new and effective way to make progress on whether certain cases of cognitive enhancement problematically undermine authenticity is to make use of considerations from the separate debate on the nature of authentic emotion. Drawing in particular on Wasserman and Liao (2008), the present paper offers new conditions that can help us assess the impact of cognitive enhancements on authenticity.
在认知增强使用的伦理工作中,普遍存在一种担忧,即这种增强会以某种方式使我们变得不真实(例如,Bublitz 和 Merkel 2009;Juth 2011)。试图澄清这种担忧的含义以及如何应对它,往往会导致关于“真实自我”的本质的争论(例如,Maslen 等人,2014)以及什么构成“真正的人类活动”(例如,Kass 2003)。本文表明,在某些情况下,认知增强是否会破坏真实性的问题上取得进展的一种新的、有效的方法是利用关于真实情感本质的独立辩论中的考虑因素。本文特别借鉴了 Wasserman 和 Liao(2008)的观点,提出了新的条件,可以帮助我们评估认知增强对真实性的影响。